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Abstract:	  New	  governance	  theory	  has	  a	  large	  following	  in	  academia	  and	  is	  exerting	  an	  
influence	  in	  numerous	  spheres	  of	  regulatory	  policy.	  	  Yet	  in	  the	  area	  of	  occupational	  health	  
and	  safety,	  new	  governance	  is	  hardly	  new	  at	  all.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  it	  in	  many	  ways	  
what	  are	  now	  labelled	  new	  governance	  concepts	  were	  first	  articulated	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  
1972	  Robens	  Report,	  Safety	  and	  Health	  at	  Work.	  	  This	  included	  its	  critique	  of	  command	  and	  
control	  legislation	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  better	  self-­‐regulation.	  	  This	  
paper	  critically	  examines	  new	  governance	  models	  in	  OHS	  regulation.	  	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  
construct	  some	  ideal	  types	  of	  OHS	  regimes	  based	  on	  three	  variables;	  state	  protection,	  
worker	  participation	  and	  employer	  management	  systems.	  	  These	  are	  used	  as	  heuristics	  in	  
subsequent	  discussion.	  	  The	  second	  part	  briefly	  discusses	  the	  roots	  of	  new	  governance	  in	  
the	  Robens	  report	  (referred	  to	  as	  ‘old’	  new	  governance)	  and	  briefly	  reviews	  Ontario’s	  
experience	  with	  it,	  to	  examine	  its	  dynamics	  and	  its	  vulnerability	  to	  regress	  toward	  neo-­‐
liberal	  self	  regulation/	  paternalism	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  effective	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  .	  	  In	  
part	  three,	  I	  focus	  on	  recent	  work	  by	  two	  North	  American	  new	  governance	  theorists,	  Orly	  
Lobel	  and	  Cynthia	  Estlund,	  who	  consciously	  wish	  avoid	  a	  collapse	  of	  new	  governance	  
approaches	  into	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  regulation/paternalism.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  despite	  their	  
aspirations,	  the	  new	  governance	  prescriptions	  they	  embrace	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  
institutionalized	  with	  the	  protective	  conditions	  they	  advocate	  and	  that	  their	  emphasis	  on	  
self-­‐regulation	  valorizes	  a	  movement	  toward	  the	  destination	  they	  wish	  to	  avoid.	  	  Finally,	  I	  
ask	  whether	  degradation	  toward	  neo-­‐liberal	  self-­‐regulation/paternalism	  is	  inevitable	  and	  if	  
not	  whether	  a	  progressive	  new	  governance	  theory	  is	  possible	  and	  has	  anything	  to	  offer	  
toward	  strengthening	  a	  regime	  of	  public	  regulation	  under	  the	  unfavourable	  conditions	  that	  
prevail	  today.	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3 OLD LESSONS FOR NEW GOVERNANCE	  
New	  governance	  theory	  has	  a	  large	  following	  in	  academia	  and	  is	  influential	  in	  
numerous	  spheres	  of	  regulatory	  policy.1	  	  Yet	  in	  the	  area	  of	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety,	  
new	  governance	  is	  hardly	  new	  at	  all.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  it	  in	  many	  ways	  what	  are	  
now	  labelled	  new	  governance	  concepts	  were	  first	  articulated	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  1972	  
Robens	  Report,	  Safety	  and	  Health	  at	  Work.	  	  This	  included	  its	  critique	  of	  command	  and	  
control	  legislation	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  development	  of	  better	  self-­‐regulation.2	  	  Thus	  it	  
is	  particularly	  fitting	  that	  we	  return	  to	  Theo	  Nichols	  and	  Pete	  Armstrong’s	  early	  critique	  of	  
the	  Robens	  Report	  for	  some	  old	  lessons	  for	  new	  governance	  in	  occupational	  health	  and	  
safety	  (OHS)	  regulation.	  	  While	  much	  of	  their	  monograph	  criticized	  the	  Robens	  Report	  for	  
blaming	  apathy	  as	  the	  underlying	  source	  of	  workplace	  injuries	  (which	  justified	  its	  call	  for	  
more	  self-­‐regulation),	  Nichols	  and	  Armstrong’s	  response	  was	  that	  a	  proper	  understanding	  
of	  risk	  creation	  had	  to	  take	  as	  its	  starting	  point	  the	  pressure	  for	  production	  generated	  
within	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.	  From	  their	  political	  economy	  perspective,	  the	  
central	  regulatory	  problem	  was	  how	  to	  counteract	  the	  pressure	  to	  prioritize	  production	  
over	  safety,	  and	  their	  solution	  required	  shifting	  power	  over	  production	  to	  workers	  on	  the	  
shop	  floor.3	  	  	  
Clearly,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  OHS	  regulation	  have	  not	  remained	  static	  in	  the	  
nearly	  forty	  years	  that	  have	  passed	  since	  their	  intervention;	  nor	  have	  the	  economic,	  
1 For a critical discussion of the roots of governance theory and its dispersion across policy networks, see Jonathan 
S. Davies, Challenging Governance Theory (Bristol: Polity Press, 2011). 
2 Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Committee 1970-72, Chair Lord Robens, (London: Cmnd 5034 1972), 
para. 41. (“The most fundamental conclusion to which our investigations have led is this.  There are severe practical 
limits on the extent to which progressively better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about 
through negative regulation by external agencies.  We need a more effectively self-regulating system.” (emphasis in 
the original)) 
3 Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong, Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents & the Conventional Wisdom (Bristol: 
Flling Wall Press, 1973). 
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political	  and	  social	  conditions	  of	  production.	  	  Thus	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  follow	  the	  
growth	  and	  development	  of	  new	  governance	  thinking	  about	  OHS,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  
in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Nichols	  and	  Armstrong,	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  
new	  governance	  theorists	  make	  about	  the	  world	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  their	  
prescriptions	  if	  they	  are	  wrong,	  and	  to	  consider	  alternative	  reforms	  that	  focus	  on	  building	  
public	  regulatory	  capacity.	  
The	  chapter	  proceeds	  in	  four	  parts.	  	  In	  the	  first,	  I	  construct	  some	  ideal	  types	  of	  OHS	  
regimes	  based	  on	  three	  variables;	  state	  protection,	  worker	  participation	  and	  employer	  
management	  systems.	  	  These	  are	  used	  as	  heuristics	  in	  subsequent	  discussion.	  	  The	  second	  
part	  briefly	  discusses	  the	  roots	  of	  new	  governance	  in	  the	  Robens	  report	  (referred	  to	  as	  ‘old’	  
new	  governance)	  and	  briefly	  reviews	  Ontario’s	  experience	  with	  it,	  to	  illuminate	  its	  
dynamics	  and	  its	  vulnerability	  to	  regress	  toward	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  regulation/paternalism	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  effective	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  .	  	  In	  part	  three,	  I	  focus	  on	  recent	  work	  by	  two	  
North	  American	  new	  governance	  theorists,	  Orly	  Lobel	  and	  Cynthia	  Estlund,	  who	  
consciously	  wish	  to	  avoid	  a	  collapse	  of	  new	  governance	  approaches	  into	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  
regulation/paternalism.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  despite	  their	  aspirations,	  the	  new	  governance	  
prescriptions	  they	  embrace	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  institutionalized	  with	  the	  protective	  
conditions	  they	  advocate	  and	  that	  their	  emphasis	  on	  self-­‐regulation	  valorizes	  a	  movement	  
toward	  the	  destination	  they	  wish	  to	  avoid.	  	  Finally,	  I	  ask	  whether	  degradation	  toward	  neo-­‐
liberal	  self-­‐regulation/paternalism	  is	  inevitable	  and,	  if	  not,	  whether	  a	  progressive	  new	  
governance	  theory	  that	  aims	  to	  strengthen	  a	  regime	  of	  public	  regulation	  under	  the	  
unfavourable	  conditions	  that	  prevail	  today	  provides	  a	  better	  alternative.	  	  	  
5                          OLD LESSONS FOR NEW GOVERNANCE	  
	  
	  
Constructing	  Ideal	  Types	  
	  	   For	  the	  purpose	  of	  locating	  new	  governance	  theories	  of	  OHS	  regulation	  within	  a	  
range	  of	  possible	  configurations,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  construct	  some	  ideal	  types	  of	  regimes.	  
In	  the	  past,	  I	  attempted	  to	  map	  out	  regimes	  of	  OHS	  regulation	  using	  two	  axes,	  state	  
protection	  and	  worker	  participation.4	  	  The	  focus	  of	  that	  study	  was	  on	  worker	  citizenship	  in	  
the	  OHS	  regimes,	  not	  with	  OHS	  regulation	  more	  generally.	  	  That	  approach	  left	  out	  an	  
important	  dimension	  of	  current	  regulatory	  practice,	  promotion	  of	  employer	  OHS	  
management,	  which	  must	  be	  brought	  in	  if	  we	  are	  going	  to	  investigate	  new	  governance’s	  
emphasis	  on	  self-­‐regulation.	  The	  term	  “OHS	  management”	  as	  used	  here	  does	  not	  refer	  
specifically	  to	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  an	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety	  management	  
systems	  defined	  as	  a	  “systematic	  managerial	  process	  to	  detect,	  abate	  and	  prevent	  
workplace	  hazards.”5	  Rather,	  it	  refers	  to	  state	  policies	  that	  support	  the	  development	  of	  
employer	  competence	  and	  commitment	  to	  manage	  OHS	  (other	  than	  by	  command	  and	  
control	  regulation	  or	  strengthening	  worker	  participation).	  	  This	  might	  include	  education	  
and	  promotional	  activities,	  support	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  sectoral	  safety	  associations	  and	  the	  
use	  of	  economic	  incentives	  in	  the	  workers’	  compensation	  system,	  including	  experience	  and	  
merit	  rating.	  	  	  
	  	   For	  the	  purposes	  of	  constructing	  ideal	  types	  I	  have	  adopted	  a	  binary	  weak/strong	  
assessment	  for	  each	  element,	  although	  obviously	  this	  is	  a	  gross	  oversimplification	  that	  
                                                
4 Tucker, “Re-Mapping Worker Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety Regimes,” (2007) 37 
International Journal of Health Services 145-70. 
5 Frick, Jensen, Quinlan and Wilthagen, “Systematic Occupational Helath and Safety Management – An 
Introduction to a New Strategy for Occupational Health and Safety Well-Being,” in same eds. Systematic 
Occupational Health and Safety Management (2000), 1. 
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ignores	  the	  enormous	  variation	  within	  actual	  regimes	  based	  on	  industry,	  region,	  etc.	  	  Table	  
1	  presents	  the	  eight	  logically	  possible	  combinations.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Ideal	  Types	  of	  OHS	  Regimes	  
	  
	  
	  	   I	  am	  not	  particularly	  concerned	  to	  defend	  the	  labels	  I	  have	  attached	  to	  these	  ideal	  
types	  but	  perhaps	  it	  is	  worth	  briefly	  explaining	  my	  thinking	  on	  them.	  	  The	  regimes	  can	  be	  
divided	  into	  two	  clusters	  based	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  weak	  or	  strong	  state	  protection.	  	  
Beginning	  with	  the	  former,	  in	  a	  laissez-­‐faire	  or	  neo-­‐liberal	  regime,	  the	  state	  does	  not	  
actively	  support	  any	  of	  the	  three	  dimensions	  of	  OHS	  regulation.	  	  In	  this	  regime,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  
that	  employer	  provision	  of	  high	  quality	  work	  environments	  will	  spontaneously	  emerge,	  
notwithstanding	  the	  business-­‐case	  arguments	  that	  are	  often	  made	  for	  it.6	  	  The	  historical	  
                                                
6 For a literature review of the business case, see Courtney Davis, Making Companies Safe: What Works? (Centre of 
Corporate Accountability 2004), 69-72.  Also, see Susan Margaret Hart, “Self-regulation, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Business Case: Do They Work in Achieving Workplace Equality and Safety?” (2010), 92 
Journal of Business Ethics 585; Peter Dorman, “If Safety Pays, Why Don’t Employers Invest in It?” in Frick, 
Systematic, 351; Dave Johnson, “What Ever Happened to the Business Case for Safety?”(21 September 2005), 4:9 
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evidence	  for	  laissez-­‐faire	  regimes	  that	  dominated	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  supports	  
this	  view;	  workers	  were	  routinely	  exposed	  to	  highly	  dangerous	  conditions	  in	  mines,	  
factories,	  and	  railways	  and	  suffered	  high	  rates	  of	  injury,	  disease	  and	  death.7	  	  A	  similar	  
conclusion	  can	  be	  reached	  about	  OHS	  management	  in	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  world	  when	  union	  
representation	  and	  state	  regulation	  are	  declining	  and	  production	  is	  increasingly	  organized	  
through	  diffuse	  contractual	  networks	  rather	  direct	  management	  of	  employees.8	  	  	  
	  	   For	  this	  reason,	  most	  states	  have	  chosen	  to	  intervene	  on	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  three	  
dimensions	  of	  regulation.	  	  The	  regime	  that	  deviates	  least	  from	  the	  ideology	  and	  practice	  of	  
laissez-­‐faire	  or	  neo-­‐liberalism	  operates	  by	  only	  promoting	  employer	  OHS	  management,	  
typically	  through	  some	  combination	  of	  educational	  activities,	  support	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  
employer	  safety	  associations,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  economic	  incentives	  in	  a	  workers’	  
compensation	  system.	  	  I	  have	  labelled	  this	  kind	  of	  regime	  “paternalist	  promotional”	  insofar	  
as	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  workers	  with	  any	  rights	  and	  operates	  primarily	  by	  encouraging	  
management	  to	  behave	  responsibly.	  	  Arguably,	  this	  approach	  prevailed	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  
farm	  worker	  safety	  in	  Ontario	  before	  the	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety	  act	  was	  extended	  
to	  agriculture	  in	  2006.	  	  Farm	  workers	  neither	  enjoyed	  an	  entitlement	  to	  minimum	  OHS	  
standards	  nor	  a	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  OHS	  management,	  but	  they	  were	  covered	  by	  the	  
workers’	  compensation	  system,	  which	  supported	  a	  farm	  safety	  association	  and	  farm	  
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ishn.com/Articles/Newsletter_Archive/d5b62bf8f644c010VgnVCM100000f932a8c0____(Accessed 11 
April 2011). 
7 Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); Mark Aldrich, 
Safety First (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P. 1997); Donald W. Rogers, Making Capitalism Safe (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009).  
8 Nichols and Tucker, “OHS Management Systems in the United Kingdom and Ontario, Canada: A Political 
Economy Perspective” in Kaj Frick et al., eds. Systematic Occupational Health and Safety Management 
(Amsterdam: Pergamon, 2000) 285; Quinlan and Mayhew, “Precarious Employment, Work Re-Organization and the 
Fracturing of OHS Management,” ibid  175.  On the negative effects of neo-liberalism on OHS in the Baltic states, 
see Charles Woolfson and Matthias Beck,  “Occupational Health and Safety in Transitional Lithuania” (2003), 34 
Industrial Relations Journal 241. 
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employers	  were	  experienced	  rated	  and	  so	  had	  economic	  incentives	  to	  reduce	  claims	  costs.	  	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  this	  OHS	  regime	  performed	  poorly.9	  
	  	   A	  third	  regime	  in	  this	  cluster	  is	  one	  built	  primarily	  on	  strong	  worker	  participation	  
rights	  that	  enable	  workers	  to	  exert	  a	  significant	  level	  of	  influence	  on	  and,	  perhaps,	  control	  
over	  decision	  making	  that	  affects	  health	  and	  safety	  conditions	  at	  work.	  	  Strong	  worker	  
participation	  regimes	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  weaker	  involvement	  schemes	  that	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  largely	  cosmetic	  and	  aim	  to	  secure	  worker	  compliance	  with	  management	  
objectives.10	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  strong	  worker	  participation	  will	  emerge	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
active	  state	  support	  where	  there	  is	  widespread	  and	  effective	  worker	  self-­‐organization,	  but	  
it	  is	  more	  common	  for	  participation	  rights	  to	  become	  generalized	  and	  entrenched	  through	  
legislation	  requiring	  safety	  representatives	  and	  joint	  health	  and	  safety	  committees	  
(JHSC).11	  	  It	  is	  difficult,	  however,	  to	  think	  of	  any	  state	  which	  has	  constructed	  an	  OHS	  regime	  
primarily	  around	  strong	  worker	  participation.	  
	  	   A	  more	  common	  route	  for	  states	  that	  wish	  to	  limit	  direct	  state	  regulation	  but	  hope	  
to	  improve	  OHS	  outcomes	  is	  one	  I	  have	  labelled	  a	  collective	  laissez-­‐faire	  regime.	  	  The	  term	  
                                                
9 Eric Tucker, “Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness be Unbroken?: The Exclusion of Ontario Farm Workers 
from the Occupational Health and Safety Act,” in Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour 
Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 256.  On the 
exclusion of farm workers generally from labour protection in the U.S., and on the limited role of the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, see Greg Schell, “Farmworker Exceptionalism under the Law” in 
Charles D. Thompson and Melinda F. Wiggins, eds., Farmworkers’ Lives, Labor and Advocacy (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2002), 139, esp. At 149-50.  Arguably, a regime of this sort operated in Ontario after the enactment 
of a workers’ compensation law in 1914, and successfully promoted OHS improvements.  See Javier Silvestre, 
“Improving Workplace Safety in the Ontario Manufacturing Industry, 1914-1939” (2010), 84 Business History 
Review 527. 
10 For a helpful discussion, see Harry Taylor, “Insights into Participation from Critical Management and Labour 
Process Perspectives” in Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, eds., Participation: The New Tyranny?(London: Zed Books, 
2001), 122-38.  
11 For example, in Ontario miners negotiated JHSCs before they became mandatory at a time when direct state 
regulation of health hazards in the mines was quite weak.  However, worker OHS representation only became 
widespread after the enactment of mandatory legislation.  Tucker, “Remapping,” 151. 
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is	  borrowed	  from	  Kahn-­‐Freund’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  English	  regime	  of	  labour	  law,	  
which	  he	  viewed	  as	  based	  on	  state	  support	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  collective	  bargaining	  
processes	  that	  allowed	  the	  parties	  maximum	  leeway	  to	  conclude	  and	  enforce	  their	  own	  
agreements.12	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  OHS	  regulation,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  state	  support	  for	  bipartite	  
regulation	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  worker	  participation	  rights	  (including	  forms	  of	  
collective	  representation)	  and	  employer	  safety	  associations.	  	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  identify	  
a	  pure	  form	  of	  this	  model,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  regulatory	  bipartism	  has	  been	  
attractive	  to	  some	  Robens-­‐	  style	  OHS	  regimes.13	  
	  	   The	  second	  cluster	  of	  OHS	  regimes	  is	  based	  on	  strong	  state	  protection.	  	  A	  pure	  
command	  and	  control	  model	  relies	  exclusively	  on	  direct	  state	  regulation.	  	  Although	  early	  
health	  and	  safety	  laws	  fit	  this	  model	  in	  principle,	  the	  reality	  was	  that	  OHS	  standards	  were	  
almost	  always	  qualified	  by	  considerations	  of	  what	  was	  practical	  and	  enforcement	  practices	  
were	  based	  on	  persuasion	  rather	  than	  prosecution.14	  	  Arguably,	  then,	  many	  of	  these	  
regimes	  operated	  more	  in	  a	  paternalist	  promotional	  mode.	  	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
they	  combined	  strong	  direct	  state	  regulation	  with	  active	  support	  for	  employer	  
management,	  they	  would	  fall	  into	  the	  model	  I	  have	  labelled	  a	  command	  and	  promote	  
regime.	  	  Finally,	  I	  have	  labelled	  a	  regime	  that	  combines	  strong	  command	  and	  control	  
regulation	  with	  support	  for	  worker	  participation	  a	  workers’	  democracy	  regime,	  and	  a	  
regime	  that	  combines	  a	  strong	  version	  of	  all	  three	  a	  social	  democratic	  regime.	  	  
Scandinavian	  models	  tended	  toward	  the	  last,	  as	  they	  supported	  strong	  employer	  OHS	  
                                                
12 For a recent discussion of Kahn-Freund’s approach, see Ruth Dukes, “Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-
Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone?” (2009), 72 Modern Law Review 220.  
13 See Tucker, “Re-Mapping.”  
14 For example, see Tucker, Administering Danger. 
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organization	  in	  conjunction	  with	  worker	  participation	  rights	  to	  promote	  bipartite	  
regulation	  with	  a	  strong	  state	  presence.15	  
	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  re-­‐emphasize	  that	  this	  is	  a	  table	  of	  ideal	  types,	  not	  actual	  historical	  
or	  current	  examples	  of	  OHS	  regulation,	  which	  are	  always	  going	  to	  be	  more	  complex.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  think	  it	  provides	  some	  useful	  heuristics	  for	  thinking	  about	  and	  comparing	  
actual	  OHS	  regimes	  and,	  in	  particular,	  for	  understanding	  and	  ultimately	  assessing	  both	  ‘old’	  
and	  ‘new’	  new	  governance	  approaches.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘Old’	  New	  Governance	  
	  	   As	  we	  noted,	  new	  governance	  theory	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  OHS	  regulation	  first	  became	  
prominent	  in	  the	  Robens	  Report	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  development	  of	  more	  effective	  
self	  regulation.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  was	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  this	  to	  occur.16	  	  
However,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere,	  Robens-­‐inspired	  regimes	  of	  mandated	  partial	  self	  
regulation	  were	  implemented	  in	  very	  different	  ways,	  depending	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  self-­‐
regulation	  permitted	  and	  on	  the	  substance	  of	  what	  was	  mandated,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  
requirements	  for	  worker	  participation.	  	  The	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  the	  
regulation	  operated	  also	  significantly	  shaped	  the	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  of	  workers	  to	  
exercise	  their	  participatory	  rights	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  state	  enforcement	  effort.	  	  Finally,	  the	  
flexibility	  inherent	  in	  these	  regimes	  meant	  that	  they	  could	  be	  reconfigured	  without	  the	  
                                                
15 Eric Tucker, "Worker Participation in Health and Safety Regulation: Lessons from Sweden," (1992) 37 Studies in 
Political Economy 95.  For an illuminating discussion of the difference between collective laissez-faire and a more 
thoroughly social democratic model of regulation, as represented by the work of Hugo Sinzheimer, see Ruth Dukes, 
“Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labour Law” (2008), 35 
Journal of Law and Society 341. 
16 Robens, para. 41. 
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necessity	  of	  new	  legislation	  by	  administrative	  action	  and	  changes	  in	  worker	  and	  union	  
leverage	  at	  the	  point	  of	  production.	  	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  regime	  was	  always	  a	  political	  
project	  in	  the	  making,	  subject	  to	  the	  competing	  objectives	  of	  workers	  and	  employers	  and,	  
therefore,	  likely	  to	  experience	  recurring	  conflict	  over	  its	  design	  and	  implementation,	  at	  
least	  as	  long	  as	  workers	  were	  actively	  engaged	  in	  pushing	  for	  stronger	  protection	  or	  
participation.17	  
	  	   In	  Ontario	  the	  Ham	  Report	  (1978)	  called	  for	  legislation	  to	  promote	  internal	  
responsibility	  systems	  (IRS)	  that	  delineated	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  employers,	  supervisors	  
and	  workers	  and	  that	  granted	  workers	  rights	  to	  know	  about	  workplace	  hazards,	  to	  
participate	  in	  OHS	  management	  through	  joint	  health	  and	  safety	  committees	  (JHSCs)	  or,	  in	  
smaller	  workplaces,	  through	  safety	  representatives,	  and	  to	  refuse	  unsafe	  work.	  	  The	  IRS	  
was	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  site	  of	  regulation,	  with	  the	  external	  responsibility	  system	  (ERS)	  of	  
enforceable	  standards,	  inspections,	  and	  prosecutions	  to	  provide	  a	  backup	  in	  instances	  
where	  the	  IRS	  failed.	  	  In	  short,	  Ham’s	  recommendations	  aimed	  to	  institutionalize	  a	  regime	  
that	  most	  closely	  resembled	  collective	  laissez-­‐faire,	  albeit	  one	  in	  which	  worker	  
participation	  rights	  were	  rather	  limited.18	  	  	  	  
	  	   The	  legislation	  that	  followed,	  however,	  did	  not	  simply	  enact	  the	  Ham	  Commission	  
recommendations.	  	  Rather	  than	  being	  an	  apolitical	  measure	  implementing	  expert	  
recommendations,	  the	  entire	  exercise,	  from	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  
enactment	  of	  legislation,	  was	  shaped	  by	  conflict	  between	  a	  strong	  worker	  OHS	  movement	  
                                                
17 Tucker, “Re-Mapping Worker Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety Regimes,” (2007) 37 
International Journal of Health Services 145; “The Politics of Occupational Health and Safety in a Cold Climate: 
Diverging Trends in Worker Protection and Participation in Canada, 1985-2000,” (2003) 58 Relations 
Industrielles/Industrial Relations 395; "Worker Participation in Health and Safety Regulation: Lessons from 
Sweden," (1992) 37 Studies in Political Economy 95. 
18 Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines (James M. Ham, 
Commissioner) (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976). 
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that	  was	  pressuring	  the	  government	  to	  address	  serious	  OHS	  hazards	  that	  it	  was	  publicizing	  
on	  an	  ongoing	  basis	  and	  an	  employer	  lobby	  that	  was	  resistant	  to	  encroachments	  on	  
managerial	  prerogatives.	  The	  resulting	  OHS	  legislation	  was	  shaped	  by	  these	  pressures,	  but	  
also	  aimed	  to	  contain	  them.19	  	  It	  promoted	  self	  regulation	  through	  the	  IRS	  with	  a	  secondary	  
role	  for	  direct	  state	  protection.	  	  This	  approach	  did	  not	  calm	  the	  political	  waters,	  as	  worker	  
OHS	  activists	  often	  found	  management	  resistant	  to	  addressing	  their	  health	  and	  safety	  
concerns	  and	  the	  state	  reluctant	  to	  enforce	  the	  law.	  	  In	  response,	  workers	  called	  for	  
legislation	  to	  increase	  their	  power	  within	  the	  IRS	  and	  to	  strengthen	  the	  ERS	  -­‐	  a	  regime	  
more	  akin	  to	  the	  worker	  democracy	  model.20	  	  More	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  led	  to	  
legislative	  revisions	  in	  1990	  that	  better	  institutionalized	  worker	  participation	  by	  
mandating	  more	  procedural	  requirements	  for	  JHSCs,	  but	  did	  not	  expand	  the	  powers	  of	  
committees	  or	  increase	  the	  strength	  of	  worker	  rights.	  	  The	  law	  also	  expanded	  regulatory	  
bipartism	  by	  providing	  for	  worker-­‐management	  oversight	  of	  health	  and	  safety	  training	  in	  
the	  province.	  	  Finally,	  maximum	  penalties	  for	  violations	  were	  substantially	  increased.21	  	  
Overall,	  there	  was	  some	  movement	  toward	  a	  social	  democratic	  model,	  but	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
change	  was	  modest.	  
	  	   Ironically,	  the	  election	  of	  a	  labour	  friendly	  New	  Democratic	  Party	  government	  in	  
1990,	  shortly	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  OHS	  reforms,	  was	  accompanied	  by	  less,	  not	  more	  
                                                
19 Robert Storey and Eric Tucker, “All that is Solid Melts into Air: Worker Participation and Occupational Health 
and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1970-2000,” in Vernon Mogensen, ed., Worker Safety Under Siege (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 157-86. 
20 Richard Fidler, “The Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Internal Responsibility System,” (1985) 24 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 315; Doug  Smith, Consulted to Death (Winnipeg, Arbeiter Ring, 2000);  Storey and 
Tucker,  
21 S.O. 1990, c. 7. 
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enforcement.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  militant	  worker	  OHS	  movement	  that	  had	  been	  so	  effective	  
over	  the	  previous	  fifteen	  years	  or	  so	  began	  to	  weaken,	  perhaps	  in	  part	  because	  trade	  union	  
officials	  did	  not	  want	  to	  embarrass	  ‘their’	  government	  and	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  economic	  
recession	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  not	  only	  made	  other	  workplace	  issues	  more	  pressing,	  but	  also	  
increased	  the	  level	  of	  job	  fear.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  began	  to	  look	  as	  if	  Ontario	  was	  going	  to	  go	  
down	  the	  path	  followed	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  New	  Labour22	  but,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  final	  
section	  of	  the	  paper,	  it	  did	  not.	  	  	  
	  	   The	  lessons	  from	  Ontario’s	  experience	  of	  ‘old’	  new	  governance	  accord	  well	  with	  
Nichols	  and	  Armstrong’s	  political-­‐economy	  analysis.	  	  First,	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  was	  
absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  change.	  	  Second,	  that	  activism	  significantly	  shaped	  
the	  reform	  legislation;	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  political	  pressure	  from	  workers,	  the	  Ontario	  
regime	  would	  have	  been	  more	  paternalistic,	  in	  that	  the	  mandated	  IRS	  would	  provided	  for	  
weaker	  worker	  participation	  and	  state	  enforcement.23	  	  Worker	  OHS	  activism	  pushed	  the	  
model	  incrementally	  closer	  toward	  the	  worker	  or	  social	  democratic	  model.	  	  Third,	  
continuing	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  was	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  the	  regime	  form	  degrading	  into	  
a	  neo-­‐liberal/paternalist	  regime,	  in	  which	  health	  and	  safety	  would	  be	  constructed	  
according	  to	  management	  perspectives	  on	  what	  was	  reasonable	  given	  the	  cost	  constraints	  
under	  which	  management	  operated	  (profit	  over	  safety).	  	  Instead,	  activist	  workers	  were	  
able	  to	  turn	  JHSCs	  into	  arenas	  where	  independent	  worker	  voices	  exerted	  some	  influence	  on	  
management	  decisions.24	  	  Fourth,	  continuing	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  was	  responsible	  for	  
                                                
22 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus: Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation uner New 
Labour” (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 46, 50-61. 
23 For example, in the interim legislation, passed in 1976, JHSCs were only required when ordered by the ministry.  
S.O. 1976, c. 79. 
24 Alan Hall, Anne Forrest, Alan Sears and Niki Carlan, “Making a Difference: Knowledge Activism and Worker 
Representation in Joint OHS Committees,” (2006) 61 Relations Industrielles 408. 
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pushing	  the	  government	  to	  strengthen	  worker	  participation	  rights,	  even	  if	  only	  in	  the	  
direction	  of	  better	  institutionalizing	  worker	  voice	  in	  the	  IRS	  and	  the	  ERS	  but	  without	  giving	  
workers	  more	  power.	  	  Finally,	  the	  election	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  labour-­‐friendly	  government	  did	  
not	  guarantee	  that	  labour-­‐friendly	  policies	  and	  practices	  would	  be	  implemented.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  continued	  worker	  mobilization	  and	  pressure	  was	  essential	  to	  prevent	  regulatory	  
backsliding.	  	  Finally,	  as	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  declined,	  the	  regime	  slipped	  back	  towards	  
paternalism.	  
	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘New’	  New	  Governance	  
	  	   The	  Robens	  Report’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
promote	  more	  responsible	  self-­‐regulation	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  new	  governance	  theory,	  
which	  has	  since	  been	  elaborated	  and	  given	  additional	  theoretical	  justifications.	  	  When	  
addressing	  the	  limits	  of	  traditional	  command	  and	  control	  regulation,	  new	  governance	  
theorists	  emphasize	  the	  growing	  complexity	  of	  the	  external	  environment	  and	  the	  
increasing	  speed	  of	  technological	  and	  organizational	  innovation.	  	  This,	  they	  argue,	  
overloads	  the	  capacity	  of	  states	  to	  gather	  and	  process	  the	  information	  necessary	  to	  develop	  
effective	  regulations.	  	  They	  also	  emphasize	  that	  processes	  of	  globalization	  are	  hollowing	  
out	  the	  ability	  of	  national	  states	  to	  effectively	  regulate	  globalized	  activities	  and	  that	  supra-­‐
national	  regulatory	  institutions	  are	  too	  underdeveloped	  to	  fill	  the	  void.	  	  Moreover,	  they	  
posit	  that	  command	  and	  control	  strategies	  are	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  The	  imposition	  of	  
substantive	  standards	  creates	  rigidities	  both	  in	  law	  and	  in	  the	  social	  fields	  that	  regulation	  is	  
attempting	  to	  control.	  	  Existing	  regulation	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  quickly	  outdated	  and	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irrelevant,	  producing	  both	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  over-­‐regulation	  of	  old	  hazards	  and	  under-­‐
regulation	  of	  new	  and	  emerging	  ones.	  Finally,	  the	  targets	  of	  regulation	  increasingly	  resist	  
what	  regulation	  there	  is	  and	  oppose	  new	  regulation,	  thus	  further	  limiting	  the	  state’s	  
capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  work	  environment,	  rendering	  it	  even	  less	  effective.	  	  
In	  short,	  they	  say,	  we	  have	  a	  vicious	  circle.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  command	  and	  control	  regulation	  
impair	  the	  capacity	  and	  motivation	  of	  private	  actors	  to	  solve	  problems	  on	  their	  own	  and	  
reduce	  economic	  efficiency,	  but	  it	  also	  fails	  to	  achieve	  its	  normative	  goals.	  	  Workers	  and	  
employers	  are	  both	  made	  worse	  off.25	  
	  	   Much	  of	  this	  narrative	  might	  also	  fit	  within	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  critique	  of	  traditional	  
regulation,	  but	  new	  governance	  theorists	  insist	  they	  are	  not	  abandoning	  the	  normative	  goal	  
of	  improved	  OHS	  outcomes	  to	  the	  naked	  pursuit	  of	  efficiency	  within	  an	  increasingly	  
competitive	  global	  economy.	  	  Rather,	  they	  claim	  that	  new	  governance	  theory	  provides	  an	  
approach	  to	  regulation	  that	  steers	  a	  third-­‐way	  between	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  regulation,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  A	  variety	  of	  names	  have	  been	  appended	  
to	  this	  approach	  including	  reflexive	  regulation;	  responsive	  regulation	  and	  regulated	  self-­‐
regulation,	  amongst	  others.26	  	  	  Although	  there	  are	  variations	  in	  emphasis,	  the	  focus	  of	  new	  
governance	  is	  on	  steering	  corporate	  governance	  or	  management	  systems	  in	  socially	  
desirable	  directions	  –	  other	  than	  by	  simply	  commanding	  them	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  prescribed	  
ways.	  	  It	  is	  posited	  that	  law	  can	  facilitate	  more	  cooperative	  processes	  that	  are	  flexible,	  
responsive	  and	  participatory,	  and	  that	  align	  the	  firm’s	  interests	  with	  substantive	  regulatory	  
                                                
25 The literature is vast.  I have tended to focus on North American contributors, particularly Lobel and Estlund, 
whose work will be discussed in more detail, infra. 
26 Eg. Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983), 17 Law and Society Review 
239; and Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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goals	  that	  are	  not	  fundamentally	  altered	  by	  new	  governance	  methods.	  	  Tools	  include	  the	  
use	  of	  incentives,	  increasing	  participation	  of	  stakeholders,	  requiring	  information	  sharing,	  
and	  	  formal	  auditing,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  networks	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  nodal	  
points	  at	  which	  influence	  can	  be	  exerted,	  often	  by	  other	  private	  actors,	  is	  central	  to	  this	  
approach.27	  
	  	   People	  who	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  OHS	  regulation	  for	  the	  past	  several	  decades	  might	  
wonder,	  with	  good	  reason,	  whether	  new	  governance	  is	  worthy	  of	  the	  appellation	  “new”.	  	  
Not	  only	  are	  the	  roots	  of	  these	  ideas	  found	  in	  the	  Robens	  Report,	  but	  OHS	  regulation	  in	  
many	  countries,	  including	  the	  UK	  and,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Canada,	  has	  developed	  more	  or	  less	  
along	  the	  regulatory	  track	  that	  new	  governance	  theorists	  are	  now	  elaborating,	  including	  
mandatory	  disclosure	  of	  hazard	  information,	  mandated	  JHSCs	  and	  a	  reduced	  reliance	  on	  
state	  standard	  setting	  and	  enforcement.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  new	  
governance	  theorists	  have	  been	  attracted	  to	  current	  practices	  of	  OHS	  regulation	  as	  
outstanding	  if	  imperfect	  examples	  of	  new	  governance	  theory	  in	  action.	  	  	  
	  	   In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  worth	  spending	  some	  time	  looking	  at	  Lobel’s	  influential	  2005	  
article,	  “Interlocking	  Regulatory	  and	  Industrial	  Relations:	  The	  Governance	  of	  Workplace	  
Safety”28	  since	  it	  provides	  insight	  into	  both	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  
approach.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  article	  is	  devoted	  to	  documenting	  the	  failure	  of	  U.S.	  OHS	  regulation,	  
pointing	  out	  that	  as	  a	  system	  of	  command	  and	  control	  it	  is	  incredibly	  ineffective:	  inspection	  
resources	  are	  grossly	  inadequate;	  penalties	  for	  violating	  the	  law	  are	  paltry,	  and	  
                                                
27 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltanham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).  Also, see Davies, 
Challenging Governance, for a critical discussion of networked governance ideology and practice. 
28 (2005) 57 Administrative. Law Review 1071.   
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prosecutions	  are	  rare.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  new	  world	  of	  work	  is	  increasing	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
regulation	  because	  of	  accelerating	  innovation,	  vertical	  disintegration	  of	  firms	  and	  the	  
corresponding	  growth	  of	  complex	  supply	  chains,	  and	  the	  challenge	  of	  addressing	  injuries	  
that	  arise	  not	  from	  trauma	  but	  from	  job	  stresses	  and	  strains.	  	  What	  then	  is	  to	  be	  done?	  	  The	  
overarching	  objective	  is	  to	  make	  OHS	  a	  shared	  interest	  that	  can	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  core	  
ends	  of	  economic	  enterprises.	  	  Regulatory	  agencies	  can	  achieve	  this	  by	  identifying	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  effective	  self	  regulation	  works,	  promoting	  their	  development,	  and	  
recognizing	  when	  those	  conditions	  are	  absent.29	  
	  	   Taking	  the	  case	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  Administration	  (OSHA),	  
Lobel	  identifies	  a	  number	  of	  voluntary	  compliance	  programs	  developed	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  
90s	  that	  signalled	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  command	  and	  control	  to	  a	  new	  governance	  model	  that	  
fostered	  public/private	  partnership,	  encouraged	  industry	  cooperation,	  and	  allowed	  
flexibility	  in	  policy	  implementation.30	  	  However,	  she	  is	  also	  keenly	  aware	  that	  such	  a	  shift	  
can	  also	  provide	  a	  cover	  for	  neo-­‐liberal	  deregulation	  by	  allowing	  firms	  to	  escape	  even	  a	  
weak	  threat	  of	  sanction	  for	  failure	  to	  achieve	  politically	  established	  regulatory	  standards.31	  	  
Therefore,	  Lobel	  argues,	  institutional	  arrangements	  must	  be	  put	  into	  place	  to	  avoid	  this	  
result,	  and	  she	  identifies	  two	  principles,	  exit	  and	  voice,	  to	  guide	  this	  exercise.	  	  The	  exit	  
principle	  requires	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  dual-­‐track	  system	  of	  enforcement	  and	  sanctions	  so	  that	  
firms	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  clear	  choice:	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  responsibly	  self	  regulate,	  they	  will	  be	  made	  
subject	  to	  an	  effective,	  coercive	  command	  and	  control	  regime	  of	  enforcement.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  
the	  big	  stick	  has	  to	  be	  credible.	  	  The	  voice	  principle	  requires	  effective	  worker	  participation	  
                                                
29 Lobel, “Interlocking,”1104. 
30 Ibid., 1111. 
31 Kimberly D. Krawiec, “Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of  Negotiated Governance” (2003), 81 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 487. 
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in	  the	  firm’s	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety	  management	  system.	  	  This	  fits	  with	  new	  
governance’s	  emphasis	  on	  mobilizing	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  as	  a	  means	  for	  pressuring	  
private	  corporations	  to	  act	  responsibly,	  even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  in	  the	  corporation’s	  short-­‐term	  
economic	  interest.	  
	  	   On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  Lobel’s	  prescriptions	  resemble	  a	  social	  democratic	  model	  of	  OHS	  
regulation	  insofar	  as	  she	  insists	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  strong	  state	  to	  deal	  with	  laggards,	  
worker	  participation	  in	  the	  design	  of	  regulated	  self	  regulation	  schemes	  and	  state	  support	  
for	  employer	  OHS	  management.32	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  position	  Lobel	  adopted	  in	  an	  
earlier	  article,	  which	  identified	  three	  overarching	  projects	  intertwined	  in	  new	  governance	  
theory:	  economic	  efficiency,	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  social	  democracy.	  	  Lobel	  noted	  that	  
choices	  must	  be	  made	  and	  balances	  struck	  between	  these	  projects,	  but	  explicitly	  adopted	  a	  
social	  democratic	  perspective,	  insisting	  that	  substantive	  commitments	  to	  the	  achievement	  
of	  public	  ends	  must	  be	  maintained.33	  	  But	  how	  difficult	  will	  that	  be?	  	  	  
	  	   The	  answer	  will	  depend	  to	  a	  great	  degree	  on	  the	  view	  taken	  of	  regulatory	  dilemmas	  
in	  OHS	  and	  their	  resolution.34	  	  In	  the	  political	  economy	  tradition,	  exemplified	  by	  Nichols	  
and	  Armstrong,	  OHS	  regulation	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  realm	  of	  recurring	  regulatory	  dilemmas	  that	  
stem	  from	  the	  relentless	  requirement	  within	  capitalism	  to	  produce	  for	  profit.	  	  To	  do	  this,	  
capitalists	  must	  constantly	  pursue	  technological	  and	  organization	  innovation.	  	  This	  drive	  
does	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  hazardous	  working	  conditions,	  but	  historically	  it	  
                                                
32 Indeed, in earlier work she argued quite stronger for the view that new governance should be committed to the 
achievement of social democratic values. See Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004), 89 Minnesota Law Review 262 at 387. 
33 Lobel, Renew Deal, 387. 
34 Eric Tucker, “Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?” (2010), 
39 Industrial Law Journal 99. 
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often	  has	  and	  presently	  it	  often	  does.	  	  But	  the	  fundamental	  point,	  as	  Nichols	  and	  Armstrong	  
argued,	  is	  that	  there	  is	  systematic	  pressure	  within	  capitalist	  economies	  to	  privilege	  profit-­‐
seeking	  over	  other	  objectives,	  including	  OHS,	  whenever	  those	  other	  objectives	  impose	  a	  
barrier	  to	  the	  circulation	  and	  expansion	  of	  capital.	  	  The	  development	  of	  regulation	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  working	  people35	  involves	  the	  imposition	  of	  limits	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  owners	  and	  
managers	  of	  capital	  to	  engage	  in	  profit	  seeking	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  safety.	  	  As	  such,	  regulatory	  
dilemmas	  will	  be	  a	  recurring	  phenomenon	  and	  must	  be	  considered	  from	  a	  class	  
perspective,	  since	  at	  its	  core	  OHS	  regulation	  involves	  a	  conflict	  between	  those	  who	  want	  to	  
impose	  limits	  on	  capital	  and	  capital’s	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  maximum	  freedom	  to	  manage	  
and	  control	  its	  activities	  in	  a	  self-­‐interested	  way.	  	  	  	  
	  	   Erik	  Olin	  Wright’s	  model	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  class	  compromise	  suggests	  that	  
positive	  class	  collaboration	  is	  possible	  within	  certain	  limits	  when	  workers	  have	  achieved	  a	  
certain	  level	  of	  power.36	  	  Apart	  from	  situations	  in	  which	  improved	  safety	  and	  profit	  
maximization	  coincide,	  the	  fundamental	  condition	  is	  that	  working	  class	  organization	  must	  
be	  sufficiently	  strong	  so	  that	  the	  costs	  to	  employers	  of	  cooperating	  with	  labour	  are	  lower	  
than	  the	  costs	  of	  conflict.	  	  This	  can	  happen	  because	  worker	  organization,	  if	  it	  is	  sufficiently	  
strong,	  can	  help	  employers	  overcome	  their	  collective	  action	  problem	  by,	  for	  example,	  
imposing	  standardized	  conditions	  across	  an	  industry	  and	  reducing	  competitive	  pressures.	  	  
Applied	  to	  OHS	  regulation,	  the	  argument	  would	  be	  that	  if	  workers,	  operating	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  the	  state,	  can	  insure	  that	  all	  employers	  operate	  at	  the	  same	  high	  standard	  employers	  
                                                
35 It is worth noting here that in  Regulatory Capitalism Braithwaite emphasizes the ongoing role of regulation and 
therefore rejects the view that a neo-liberal order has emerged.  What he ignores, however, is that the nature of 
regulatory capitalism has changed.  Instead of regulation that restrains capitalism, we now have regulation that 
facilitates the growth of economic and social inequality.  To make the persistence of regulation the central story 
while ignoring the shift in class power that neo-liberal policies have facilitated seems peculiar at best. 
36 Erik Olin Wright, “Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise” (2000) 105 
American Journal of Sociology 957. 
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will	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  coregulate	  the	  work	  environment	  since	  they	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  
their	  competitors	  will	  not	  gain	  an	  edge	  by	  producing	  less	  safely	  but	  more	  cheaply.	  	  Swedish	  
models	  of	  OHS	  regulation	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  arguably	  went	  some	  way	  toward	  meeting	  
this	  condition	  but	  as	  Swedish	  capital	  became	  more	  globalized	  in	  recent	  decades,	  workplace	  
organization	  at	  the	  national	  level	  is	  less	  able	  to	  reduce	  competitive	  pressures.37	  
	  	   New	  governance	  theorists	  are	  not	  insensitive	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  
and	  unequal	  power	  relations	  but,	  like	  ‘old’	  new	  governance	  theory,	  they	  generally	  seek	  to	  
minimize	  their	  salience	  and	  avoid	  the	  need	  for	  trade-­‐offs.	  The	  assumption	  of	  common	  
interests	  in	  OHS	  deeply	  informed	  the	  Robens	  Report.	  “Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  natural	  
affinity	  of	  interest	  between	  ‘the	  two	  sides’	  in	  relation	  to	  safety	  and	  health	  problems	  than	  in	  
most	  other	  matters.	  	  There	  is	  no	  legitimate	  scope	  for	  ‘bargaining’	  on	  safety	  and	  health	  
issues,	  but	  much	  scope	  for	  constructive	  discussion,	  joint	  inspection,	  and	  participation	  in	  
working	  out	  solutions.”38	  	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  Robens	  put	  the	  terms	  ‘the	  two	  sides’	  and	  
‘bargaining’	  in	  parentheses,	  seemingly	  to	  emphasize	  his	  doubt	  that	  there	  really	  were	  two	  
sides	  that	  had	  something	  to	  bargain	  over.39	  	  The	  report	  recommended	  worker	  
participation,	  not	  to	  act	  as	  a	  check	  on	  management’s	  penchant	  to	  stint	  on	  OHS,	  but	  rather	  to	  
                                                
37 Kaj Frick, “Health and Safety Representation in Small Firms: A Swedish Success under Threat” in D. Walters and 
T. Nichols, eds., Workplace Health and Safety: International Perspectives on Worker Representation (Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009): Eric Tucker, “"Worker Participation in Health and Safety Regulation: Lessons 
from Sweden," (1992) 37 Studies in Political Economy 95. 
38 Robens, para. 66. 
39 Robens, paras. 13, 28 and 41. 
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encourage	  workers	  to	  accept	  “their	  full	  share	  of	  responsibility”	  and	  to	  monitor	  conditions	  
for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  information	  that	  employers	  would	  act	  upon.40	  	  	  
	  	   New	  new	  governance	  theorists	  have	  continued	  in	  this	  tradition	  of	  emphasizing	  
common	  interests	  and	  margializing	  the	  significance	  of	  class	  conflict	  over	  OHS.41	  	  For	  
example,	  Lobel	  states,	  “Nonetheless,	  rich	  bases	  of	  ethnographies	  and	  comparative	  studies	  
indicate	  that	  intense	  conflict	  between	  labor	  and	  capital	  around	  issues	  of	  occupational	  
health	  and	  safety	  may	  be	  anomalous.”	  	  She	  then	  quotes	  Robens	  for	  this	  proposition.42	  	  
Earlier	  in	  her	  article	  Lobel	  also	  addressed	  this	  issue	  in	  developing	  an	  argument	  that	  firms	  
operated	  pursuant	  to	  a	  mixed	  set	  of	  motivations.	  	  However,	  even	  within	  that	  context,	  Lobel	  
emphasized	  the	  business	  case	  for	  safety,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  reduction	  of	  accident	  costs,	  
including	  improved	  worker	  morale,	  reduced	  absenteeism,	  and	  consumer	  preference	  for	  
goods	  and	  services	  that	  are	  produced	  safely.43	  	  	  
	  	   This	  last	  point	  links	  to	  an	  argument	  often	  found	  in	  ‘new’	  new	  governance	  theory	  
about	  the	  significance	  of	  reputational	  risk	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  firm	  behaviour.	  	  Here	  the	  argument	  
is	  that	  a	  poor	  health	  and	  safety	  performance	  will	  negatively	  affect	  the	  firm’s	  bottom	  line	  
either	  because	  consumers	  will	  avoid	  its	  products	  or	  because	  other	  firms	  will	  not	  wish	  to	  do	  
business	  with	  unsafe	  firms.	  	  Safety	  pays,	  at	  least	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  reducing	  the	  need	  to	  
confront	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  economic	  efficiency	  (profit)	  and	  social	  democratic	  values	  
(worker	  safety).	  	  The	  assumption	  of	  common	  interests	  between	  workers	  and	  employers	  
built	  on	  the	  business	  case	  for	  safety	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  OHS	  regulation	  going	  back	  to	  the	  
                                                
40 Robens, para. 59.  This view also informed the Ham Report which asserted (at 250) that health and safety was not 
a suitable issue for collective bargaining 
41 See Davies, Challenging Governance, who also emphasizes the ways in which governance and network theorists 
reject the continuing salience of class and class-based conflict. 
42 Lobel, “Interlocking,” 1128.  Notably the additional sources in her footnote on this point (fn. 274), do not for the 
most part provide empirical support for the common  interest proposition. 
43 Ibid., 1102.   
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factory	  acts	  and	  has	  often	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  subtle	  renorming	  of	  its	  objects	  toward	  
the	  elimination	  of	  those	  risks	  that	  are	  excessive	  –	  from	  a	  business	  perspective.44	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  persistence	  of	  business	  case	  arguments,	  often	  found	  on	  government	  
websites,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  business	  case	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  much	  
criticism	  and	  its	  limits	  identified.45	  
	  	   In	  addition	  to	  discounting	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  OHS	  conflicts	  with	  the	  profit	  motive,	  
new	  governance	  theorists	  also	  tend	  to	  minimize	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  profit	  motive	  when	  
conflicts	  do	  arise.	  	  In	  particular,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  high	  level	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  likelihood	  
that	  virtue	  will	  triumph	  over	  self-­‐interest.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  recent	  discussion	  of	  
restorative	  justice	  in	  the	  OHS	  context,	  Braithwaite	  describes	  restorative	  justice	  as	  a	  process	  
that	  is	  “about	  sitting	  in	  a	  circle	  discussing	  who	  has	  been	  hurt	  and	  then	  the	  victim	  being	  able	  
to	  describe	  in	  their	  own	  words	  how	  they	  are	  coping	  with	  the	  hurt	  and	  what	  they	  are	  
looking	  for	  to	  repair	  that	  harm	  and	  prevent	  it	  from	  happening	  again.	  	  It	  is	  about	  the	  virtue	  
of	  active	  responsibility	  as	  opposed	  to	  passive	  responsibility	  of	  holding	  someone	  
responsible	  for	  what	  they	  have	  done	  in	  the	  past.”	  	  If	  no	  one	  takes	  responsibility	  the	  circle	  is	  
widened	  until	  a	  “softer	  target”	  –	  presumably	  the	  virtuous	  actor	  –	  is	  hit.46	  	  Lobel	  also	  picks	  
up	  on	  this	  strain	  of	  the	  new	  governance	  theory	  when	  she	  argues	  that	  “a	  cooperative	  
governance	  framework	  can	  create	  empathy	  and	  mutual	  trust	  among	  diverse	  people.”47	  	  Left	  
here,	  we	  might	  think	  of	  this	  as	  an	  argument	  that	  virtue	  is	  immanent	  in	  business	  actors	  and	  
                                                
44 Eric Tucker, Administering Danger in Workplace, 167-73. 
45 For an example of government promotion of the business case strategy, see 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/betterbusiness/large/index.htm.  For critical assessments of the business case, see references 
at note 6. 
46 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, 76-77. 
47 Lobel, “Interlocking,” 1104. 
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just	  needs	  a	  little	  nudging	  to	  be	  activated	  and	  to	  become	  the	  guiding	  principle	  for	  business	  
decision-­‐making.	  However,	  at	  least	  one	  empirical	  study	  has	  cast	  doubt	  on	  whether	  
restorative	  justice	  responses	  influence	  behaviour.48	  This	  result	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  if	  
one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  unequal	  power	  relations	  in	  hierarchical	  
organizations	  marked	  by	  real	  differences	  in	  motivations	  and	  goals	  of	  upper-­‐level	  managers	  
and	  lower-­‐level	  workers	  undermine	  communication	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  
hegemonic	  norms	  that	  shift	  responsibility	  from	  management	  to	  individual	  workers.49	  	  
Moreover,	  as	  Harry	  Glasbeek	  notes,	  “Given	  the	  corporation’s	  recent	  historical	  role	  in	  the	  
jettisoning	  of	  such	  job	  and	  income	  security	  as	  had	  been	  won...why	  should	  anyone	  believe	  
that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  corporate	  drive	  to	  give	  back	  some	  of	  these	  gains?	  	  There	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  managers	  can	  indulge	  their	  personal	  sense	  of	  altruism	  and/or	  worker	  
friendliness	  and	  still	  be	  true	  to	  their	  real	  task.”50	  	  And	  that	  real	  task,	  as	  corporate	  law	  
scholars	  will	  tell	  you,	  is	  maximization	  of	  shareholder	  value,	  with	  all	  it	  entails.51	  
	  	   Because	  Lobel	  minimizes	  the	  salience	  of	  conflict	  and	  regulatory	  dilemmas,	  the	  OHS	  
policy	  prescriptions	  she	  favours	  are	  problematic.	  	  Lobel	  endorses	  OSHA’s	  efforts	  to	  
promote	  cooperative	  compliance	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  two-­‐track	  programs	  that	  exempt	  
qualifying	  firms	  from	  regular	  inspections,	  although	  she	  recognizes	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
strong	  commitment	  to	  command	  and	  control	  regulation	  for	  firms	  that	  do	  not	  qualify	  for	  
                                                
48 Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen and Christine Parker, “Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement” 
(2009), 3 Regulation and Governance 376. 
49 Susan S. Silbey, “Taming Prometheus: Talk About Safety Culture” (2009) 35 Annual Review of Sociology 341 at 
361-63; Heather M. Zoller, “Health on the Line: Identity and Disciplinary Control in Employee Occupational Health 
and Safety Discourse” (2003) 31 Journal of Applied Communication Research 118. 
50 Harry Glasbeek, “Book Review: Varieties of Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Employees” (2008), 22 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 293 at 303. 
51 Paddy Ireland, “Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth” (2005),  68 Modern Law Review49. 
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preferred	  treatment	  the	  model	  is	  likely	  to	  “become	  a	  guise	  for	  deregulation.”52	  	  As	  well,	  she	  
is	  critical	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  OSHA’s	  compliance	  programs	  to	  systematically	  include	  workers’	  
voices	  and	  believes	  this	  too	  should	  be	  required.	  	  Her	  solution,	  then,	  includes	  elements	  of	  
state	  protection	  and	  worker	  participation,	  but	  she	  provides	  little	  concrete	  guidance	  about	  
how	  these	  should	  be	  structured,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  pervasive	  and	  growing	  
labour	  market	  inequalities.	  	  Indeed,	  her	  treatment	  of	  inequality	  is	  particularly	  
disappointing,	  since	  it	  is	  entirely	  abstracted	  from	  capitalist	  relations	  of	  production.53	  	  
Against	  this	  background,	  Lobel’s	  emphasizes	  cooperative	  programs	  and	  employer	  OHS	  
management,	  with	  state	  enforcement	  and	  worker	  participation	  as	  contributors	  to	  the	  goal	  
of	  better	  employer	  self-­‐regulation.	  	  Yet	  she	  fails	  to	  confront	  the	  implications	  of	  prioritizing	  
this	  track	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  these	  necessary	  supports	  are	  unlikely	  to	  materialize	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  concerted	  efforts	  to	  rebuild,	  legitimize	  and	  strengthen	  public	  enforcement	  and	  
worker	  participation.	  
	  	   Here	  we	  might	  turn	  to	  Cynthia	  Estlund’	  recent	  book,	  Regoverning	  the	  Workplace.	  	  
Estlund	  comes	  to	  new	  governance	  theory	  and	  regulated	  self-­‐regulation	  as	  much	  out	  of	  
despair	  as	  hope.	  	  She	  sees	  the	  death	  of	  old	  forms	  of	  workplace	  regulation	  as	  irreversible	  
and	  more	  self-­‐regulation	  as	  inevitable.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  question	  for	  her	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  steer	  the	  development	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  toward	  new	  forms	  of	  workplace	  
governance	  in	  which	  workers	  have	  a	  real	  voice.	  	  Her	  book	  might	  be	  read	  as	  an	  internal	  
                                                
52 Lobel, “Interlocking” 1114. 
53 Ibid, 1141-44. 
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dialogue	  in	  which	  she	  tries,	  with	  only	  partial	  success,	  to	  convince	  herself	  that	  this	  is	  
possible.	  	  	  
	  	   Her	  considerable	  reservations	  about	  new	  governance	  prescriptions	  derive	  from	  her	  
better	  understanding	  of	  and	  greater	  focus	  on	  the	  realities	  of	  unequal	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  
workplace	  than	  Lobel’s.	  	  For	  example,	  although	  she	  treats	  OHS	  as	  an	  area	  in	  which	  there	  are	  
sometimes	  common	  interests,	  and	  argues	  that	  common	  interests	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  exist	  in	  
OHS	  than,	  for	  example,	  minimum	  wage	  or	  hours	  of	  work	  laws,	  she	  also	  recognizes	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  occasions	  when	  “hazards...are	  integral	  to	  the	  production	  process	  and...serve	  
the	  employer’s	  bottom	  line”	  and	  that	  sometimes	  “health	  and	  safety	  improvements	  come	  
with	  a	  significant	  price	  tag.”54	  	  	  
	  	   Because	  of	  a	  greater	  sensitivity	  to	  salience	  of	  power	  imbalances	  in	  the	  workplace,	  
Estlund	  recognizes	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  employee	  committees	  to	  cooptation	  and	  
intimidation	  given	  the	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  and	  job	  loss,	  even	  for	  unionized	  employees.55	  	  
Moreover,	  she	  also	  recognizes	  that	  internal	  committees	  are	  unlikely	  to	  effectively	  address	  
hazards	  when	  they	  conflict	  with	  profit-­‐making.	  	  So	  while	  safety	  committees	  can	  assist	  in	  
some	  ways,	  for	  example,	  by	  aggregating	  and	  articulating	  employee	  knowledge	  about	  
hazardous	  conditions	  where	  lack	  of	  communication	  is	  part	  of	  the	  problem,	  they	  need	  to	  
operate	  in	  conjunction	  with	  some	  outside	  entity	  “that	  can	  supply	  power,	  independence,	  and	  
protection	  against	  reprisals.”56	  	  
                                                
54 Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 178. 
55 Estlund, Regoverning, 176.  For a recent discussion of growing insecurity among workers with permanent, full-
time work and its negative effects on their health, see Wayne Lewchuk, Marlea Clarke, and Alice de Wolff, Working 
Without Commitments (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011).  
56 Ibid. 179. 
	  
 
26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OSGOODE	  CLPE	  RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [VOL.	  08	  NO.08]	  
	  	   Unfortunately,	  Estlund’s	  proposals	  to	  meet	  that	  need	  are	  not	  very	  promising.	  	  
Corporate	  codes	  of	  conduct	  with	  private	  independent	  monitoring	  and/or	  employee	  
whistle-­‐blower	  protection	  are	  proffered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  solution.	  	  The	  other	  piece	  is	  a	  two	  
track	  enforcement	  regime	  built	  on	  a	  beefed-­‐up	  enforcement	  track	  for	  firms	  that	  fail	  to	  self-­‐
regulate	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  second	  track	  of	  less	  frequent	  inspection	  and	  reduced	  
penalties	  for	  firms	  that	  have	  codes	  of	  conduct	  with	  independent	  monitors	  and	  protected	  
worker	  participation.	  	  Expanded	  rights	  of	  action	  for	  work	  place	  injuries,	  retaliation	  for	  
whistle-­‐blowing	  and	  violations	  of	  health	  and	  safety	  laws	  firm	  this	  up.	  	  	  
	  	   Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	  corporate	  codes	  of	  conduct	  backed	  up	  
by	  independent	  monitors	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  supply	  chains.	  	  Apart	  from	  questions	  
about	  the	  independence	  of	  monitors	  and	  their	  effectiveness,	  there	  is	  a	  more	  fundamental	  
concern	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  model.	  	  In	  nearly	  every	  case,	  the	  motivation	  is	  the	  protection	  
of	  reputational	  capital,	  and	  this	  is	  most	  heavily	  concentrated	  in	  highly	  branded	  firms	  that	  
face	  a	  real	  threat	  of	  consumer	  pressure.	  	  While	  NGOs	  might	  be	  able	  to	  mobilize	  consumer	  
opinion	  around	  the	  Nikes	  of	  this	  world,	  a	  broader	  dependence	  on	  voluntary	  and	  privately	  
monitored	  codes	  seems	  unlikely	  to	  reach	  vast	  areas	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  which	  consumer	  
branding	  does	  not	  play	  such	  a	  large	  role.57	  	  Legislative	  measures	  imposing	  legal	  liabilities	  
                                                
57 For a skeptical view, that also provides ample references to the literature, pro and con, see Harry Arthurs, 
“Corporate Self-Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law” in Cynthia Estlund 
and Brian Bercusson, eds., Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalization: New Challenges, New Institutions 
(Oxford: Hart, 2009), 19. 
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backed	  by	  meaningful	  inspection	  will	  often	  be	  required	  to	  achieve	  effective	  supply	  chain	  
regulation.58	  
	  	   The	  alternative	  of	  depending	  on	  workers	  to	  blow	  the	  whistle	  on	  their	  employers	  is	  
also	  problematic.	  	  Most	  health	  and	  safety	  acts	  currently	  protect	  workers	  against	  retaliation	  
for	  exercising	  their	  statutory	  rights,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  refuse	  unsafe	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
make	  complaints,	  but	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  strong	  union	  most	  workers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  
assertive	  protagonists.	  	  This	  is	  amply	  illustrated	  by	  Neil	  Gunningham’s	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  
Australian	  mining	  industry	  which	  draws	  a	  very	  pessimistic	  view	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
worker	  participation	  in	  a	  cold	  industrial	  relations	  climate.59	  	  This	  returns	  Estlund	  to	  the	  
conundrum	  of	  requiring	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  very	  conditions	  she	  stipulates	  as	  absent	  to	  
make	  her	  alterative	  effective.	  As	  she	  recognizes,	  in	  their	  absence	  neo-­‐liberal	  or	  paternalist	  
regimes	  of	  regulation	  are	  far	  more	  probable	  outcomes	  than	  social	  democratic	  ones.	  
	  	   To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  response	  to	  this	  weakness	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strong	  
enforcement	  track	  that	  would	  induce	  firms	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  avoid	  facing	  its	  teeth,	  it	  
presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  whose	  absence	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  
driver	  of	  the	  turn	  to	  regulated	  self-­‐regulation.	  	  If	  	  regulators	  lack	  the	  capacity	  both	  to	  
identify	  which	  firms	  genuinely	  are	  on	  the	  right	  track	  and	  to	  detect	  OHS	  violations	  and	  
appropriately	  sanction	  firms	  on	  the	  wrong	  track,	  regulated	  self-­‐regulation	  is	  quite	  likely	  to	  
degrade	  into	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  regulation/paternalism.	  	  	  
                                                
58 David Walters and Phil James, “What Motivates Employers to Establish Preventive Management Arrangements 
within Supply Chains?” (2011), 49 Safety Science 988. 
59 Neil Gunningham, “Occupational Health and Safety, Worker Participation and the Mining Industry in a Changing 
World of Work” (2008) 29(3)  Economic and Industrial Democracy 336.  Also, see Michael Quinlan and Richard 
Johnstone, “The Implications of De-Collectivist Industrial Relations Laws and Associated Developments for Worker 
Health and Safety in Australia” (2009) 40 Industrial Relations Journal 426 and David Walters and Theo Nichols, 
Worker Representation and Workplace Health and Safety (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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   Finally,	  Estlund’s	  faith	  in	  the	  power	  of	  private	  litigation	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  
employers	  to	  comply	  with	  minimum	  standards	  laws	  is,	  perhaps,	  uniquely	  American.	  	  She	  is	  
critical	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  avenues	  for	  private	  litigation	  for	  workplace	  injuries	  and	  OHS	  
violations	  and	  calls	  for	  “activating	  the	  prodigious	  regulatory	  forces	  inside	  firms”	  by	  
“arming...workers	  themselves...with	  their	  own	  regulatory	  arsenal”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  private	  
actions.60	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  employment	  litigation	  in	  the	  
United	  States,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  most	  workers,	  let	  alone	  vulnerable	  workers,	  are	  
likely	  to	  benefit	  from	  private	  rights	  of	  action	  or	  that	  they	  will	  be	  an	  effective	  substitute	  for	  
adequate	  public	  compensation	  and	  enforcement	  regimes.	  	  
	  	   So	  while	  there	  are	  differences	  among	  ‘new’	  new	  governance	  theorists,	  the	  dominant	  
tendency	  is	  to	  dissolve	  safety-­‐profit	  conflicts	  by	  assuming	  common	  interests	  prevail	  and	  to	  
minimize	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  profit-­‐seeking	  behaviour	  will	  take	  precedence	  over	  safety	  
considerations	  when	  conflicts	  do	  arise	  by	  assuming	  that	  virtue	  will	  tend	  to	  trump	  self-­‐
interest.	  	  While	  more	  social	  democratic	  new	  governance	  theorists	  are	  quite	  cognizant	  that	  
under	  conditions	  of	  unequal	  power	  relations	  new	  governance	  techniques	  face	  severe	  
challenges	  and	  could	  be	  used	  to	  further	  disempower	  the	  weak,	  their	  call	  for	  safeguards	  still	  
leaves	  in	  place	  a	  core	  agenda	  that	  favours	  more	  self-­‐regulation	  and	  reliance	  on	  non-­‐state	  
actors.	  	  Moreover,	  they	  have	  already	  found	  that	  the	  safeguards	  they	  insist	  upon,	  state	  
enforcement	  and	  worker	  voice,	  are	  irretrievably	  in	  decline.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  their	  shift	  in	  
emphasis,	  from	  public	  to	  private	  systems	  of	  regulation,	  may	  actually	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  
                                                
60 Estlund, Regoverning, 233-34. 
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that	  enforcement	  deficits	  will	  be	  exacerbated	  rather	  than	  redressed.61	  	  In	  that	  vein,	  Davies	  
argues	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  new	  governance	  theory	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  understood	  as	  a	  
dimension	  of	  neoliberal	  hegemonic	  project	  that	  aims	  to	  secure	  consent	  through	  
participation	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  common	  interests,	  while	  the	  practice	  of	  new	  
governance	  fails	  to	  deliver	  a	  new	  cooperative	  social	  order	  because	  it	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  
neoliberal	  material	  conditions	  in	  which	  new	  governance	  practices	  are	  enacted.62	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Alternative	  Paths	  
	  	   Clearly,	  one	  path	  of	  new	  governance	  practice	  is	  toward	  more	  self	  governance,	  with	  
the	  real	  danger	  that	  it	  will	  produce	  neo-­‐liberal	  or	  at	  best	  paternalist	  regimes.	  	  As	  Tombs	  
and	  Whyte	  have	  demonstrated,	  this	  is	  the	  path	  that	  has	  been	  followed	  in	  the	  UK.63	  	  From	  
Estlund’s	  perspective,	  the	  self-­‐regulation	  train	  has	  left	  the	  station	  and	  so	  there	  is	  no	  
alternative	  but	  to	  work	  within	  that	  framework	  and	  try	  to	  steer	  it	  toward	  more	  worker	  
protection.	  	  If	  that	  is	  true,	  then	  indeed	  our	  options	  are	  limited	  and	  the	  prospects	  for	  
regulatory	  renewal	  are	  dismal.	  	  The	  question	  I	  want	  to	  pose	  here	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  
alternative	  paths,	  and	  if	  so,	  whether	  a	  progressive	  new	  governance	  theory	  has	  anything	  to	  
offer.	  	  My	  answer	  to	  both	  these	  questions	  is	  a	  tentative	  yes;	  that	  a	  regime	  that	  maintains	  a	  
strong	  public	  enforcement	  focus	  is	  still	  possible	  and	  that	  a	  theory	  that	  focuses	  on	  ways	  to	  
                                                
61 For another critique of new governance theory applied to enforcement deficits,, see Guy Davidov, “The 
Enforcement Crisis in Labour Law and the Fallacy of Voluntarist Solutions (2010) 26 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 61.  Also see, Harish C. Jain et al., “Effectiveness of Canada’s 
Employment Equity Legislation for Women (1997-2004): Implications for Policy Makers” (2010) 65 Relations 
Industrielles 304 (criticizing the lack of enforcement in the employment equity laws that primarily rely on mandated 
internal responsibility and reporting)  and Shelley Marshall, “Australian Textile Clothing and Footwear Supply 
Chain Regulation” in Colin Fenwick and Tonia Novitz, eds., Human Rights at Work (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 555 
(indicating that a reflexive regulatory scheme has made failed to improve the condition of Australian outworkers). 
62 Davies, Challenging Governanace. 
63 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus: Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation under New 
Labour” (2010) 50 British Journal of Criminology 46. 
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mobilize	  civil	  society	  forces	  in	  aid	  of	  public	  enforcement	  can	  indeed	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  effective	  OHS	  regulation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  new	  world	  of	  work.	  	  	  
	  	   First,	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  regulatory	  alternatives	  that	  retain	  a	  strong	  
public	  enforcement	  component,	  let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Ontario.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier,	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s	  it	  was	  looking	  as	  if	  the	  regime	  of	  mandated	  partial	  self-­‐
regulation	  was	  going	  to	  degrade	  as	  state	  enforcement	  was	  ebbing	  and	  worker	  OHS	  activism	  
was	  subsiding.	  	  Subsequent	  events,	  however,	  tell	  a	  more	  complicated	  story,	  one	  that	  points	  
to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  trajectory	  of	  public	  enforcement	  is	  not	  necessarily	  downward	  
sloping,	  even	  under	  unfavourable	  political	  and	  economic	  conditions.	  
	  	   In	  1995	  an	  ideologically	  right	  wing	  government	  was	  elected	  and	  it	  attacked	  
collective	  bargaining	  and	  employment	  standards	  laws.	  	  But	  it	  did	  not	  go	  after	  OHS.	  	  Indeed,	  
the	  enforcement	  effort	  actually	  began	  to	  intensify	  and	  this	  upward	  trend	  has	  continued	  
since	  the	  election	  of	  a	  Liberal	  government	  in	  2003,	  although	  it	  has	  dipped	  slightly	  in	  the	  
past	  couple	  of	  years.64	  Evidence	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  number	  of	  inspections,	  orders	  
issues,	  stop	  worker	  orders	  and	  prosecutions	  (Charts	  1-­‐3).	  	  Of	  course,	  some	  of	  this	  increase	  
may	  reflect	  the	  desire	  of	  government	  to	  pump	  up	  numbers.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  enough	  to	  
manufacture	  the	  appearance	  of	  enforcement	  intensification	  by	  having	  more	  superficial	  
inspections	  and	  issuing	  more	  trivial	  orders,	  but	  this	  explanation	  is	  belied	  by	  a	  concomitant	  
increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  stronger	  enforcement	  powers,	  notably	  stop	  work	  orders	  and	  
convictions.	  	  	  
                                                
64 Eric Tucker, “Diverging Trends,” 409-412. 
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Chart	  3	  
(Source:	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Labour,	  Enforcement	  Statistics,	  various	  years)	  
	  
	  	   The	  news	  is	  not	  all	  good.	  	  The	  number	  of	  convictions,	  particularly	  after	  2005,	  is	  
inflated	  by	  the	  expansion	  of	  a	  ticketing	  system	  that	  allows	  inspectors	  to	  lay	  on-­‐the-­‐spot	  
charges	  against	  workers,	  supervisors	  and	  employers	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  OHS	  violations.	  	  In	  
practice,	  workers	  and	  supervisors	  each	  receive	  about	  37%	  of	  summonses,	  while	  employers	  
receive	  25%.	  	  As	  Garry	  Grey	  notes,	  the	  targeting	  of	  workers	  and	  front-­‐line	  supervisors	  
blurs	  the	  definition	  of	  who	  is	  an	  OHS	  offender	  and	  diffuses	  responsibility.65	  	  It	  also	  has	  
resulted	  in	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  average	  fine	  per	  conviction	  (Chart	  4).	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Chart	  4	  
(Source:	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Labour,	  Enforcement	  Statistics,	  various	  years;	  calculations	  by	  author)	  
	  
	   In	  order	  to	  assess	  trends	  in	  more	  serious	  prosecutions	  under	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  
Provincial	  Offences	  Act,	  disaggregated	  data	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Branch	  for	  
three	  years,	  2007/08	  to	  2009/10.	  	  The	  data	  show	  that	  while	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  
Part	  III	  prosecutions	  over	  these	  years,	  from	  369	  to	  445,	  the	  average	  fine	  per	  conviction	  for	  
these	  more	  serious	  offences	  declined	  from	  $35,303	  to	  $28,839.66	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  there	  has	  been	  little	  use	  of	  the	  criminal	  sanctions	  
notwithstanding	  the	  enactment	  of	  Bill	  C-­‐45,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Westray	  Bill,	  which	  came	  into	  
force	  in	  2004	  and	  was	  supposed	  to	  facilitate	  prosecution	  of	  OHS	  crimes.67	  	  Across	  Canada,	  
less	  than	  ten	  criminal	  charges	  have	  been	  laid.	  	  	  Three	  criminal	  cases	  have	  been	  brought	  in	  
Ontario.	  The	  first	  criminal	  charge	  arose	  out	  of	  a	  ditch	  collapse	  that	  killed	  a	  worker	  in	  
                                                
66 Special data run, Legal Services Branch, April 2011 (in possession of author). 
67 For a critical assessment of the legislation that has arguably been borne out by its application, see Steven Bittle 
and Laureen Snider, “From Manslaughter to Preventable Accident: Shaping Corporate Criminal Liability” (2006), 
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Newmarket,	  Ontario.	  	  The	  charge	  was	  laid	  in	  2004	  and	  was	  resolved	  by	  a	  plea	  deal	  in	  which	  
the	  criminal	  charge	  was	  dropped	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  guilty	  plea	  to	  violations	  under	  the	  OHS	  
statute.68	  	  The	  second	  criminal	  prosecution	  in	  Ontario	  was	  launched	  against	  Millenium	  
Crane,	  the	  company’s	  owner,	  and	  the	  crane	  operator	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  this	  case	  too	  the	  
charges	  were	  dropped	  after	  an	  engineering	  report	  failed	  to	  support	  the	  prosecution’s	  
case.69	  	  The	  third	  prosecution,	  which	  is	  pending	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  arose	  out	  of	  a	  
scaffolding	  collapse	  that	  killed	  four	  workers	  on	  Christmas	  Eve	  2009.	  	  The	  accused	  include	  
the	  Metron	  Construction	  Co.	  and	  three	  of	  its	  officials.70	  	  
	   In	  Quebec	  two	  criminal	  cases	  have	  resulted	  in	  convictions.	  	  In	  Transpavé	  Inc.,	  
involving	  a	  workplace	  fatality,	  the	  accused	  pleaded	  guilty	  and	  was	  fined	  $110,000.00.71	  	  
The	  first	  conviction	  after	  a	  trial	  was	  obtained	  against	  Pasquale	  Scrocca,	  a	  landscape	  
contractor.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  an	  employee	  died	  when	  the	  brakes	  on	  a	  backhoe	  Mr.	  Scrocca	  was	  
driving	  failed,	  pinning	  the	  employee	  against	  a	  wall.	  Scrocca	  received	  a	  conditional	  sentence	  
of	  imprisonment	  for	  two	  years	  less	  a	  day	  to	  be	  served	  in	  the	  community.72	  	  One	  case,	  R.	  v.	  
Gagné,	  Steve	  Lemieux	  and	  Simon	  Gagné,	  ended	  with	  an	  acquittal.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  charges	  were	  
laid	  following	  a	  collision	  between	  a	  train	  and	  a	  maintenance	  vehicle,	  which	  resulted	  in	  one	  
death	  and	  three	  injuries.	  	  The	  two	  accused	  individuals	  were	  employees	  of	  Québec-­‐Cartier:	  
                                                
68 Cheryl Edwards, “Where Are All the C-45 OHS Prosecutions?” 
http://www.heenanblaikie.com/en/media/pdfs/pdf/Where_Are_All_the_Bill_C-
45_Prosecutions.pdf;jsessionid=94884D7F485727D18FFBDE0ED30ABFCA (visited 8 August 2011). 
69 “C-45 Charges Against Ontario Crane Company Dropped” Canadian Employment Law Today (4 January 2011)  
http://www.employmentlawtoday.com/ArticleView.aspx?l=1&articleid=2450 (visited 8 August 2011). 
70 Norm Keith, “Regulators Gone Wild!” Canadian Occupational Health and Safety (27 January 2011) 
http://www.cos-mag.com/Legal/Legal-Columns/regulators-gone-wild.html (visited 8 August 2011). 
71 R. v. Transpavé Inc. 2008 QCCQ 1598. 
72 R. v. Scrocca, 2010 QCCQ 8218. 
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Steve	  Lemieux,	  was	  the	  train	  operator,	  and	  Simon	  Gagné,	  was	  a	  foreman.	  	  Justice	  Dionne	  
found	  that	  the	  mistakes	  made	  by	  the	  employees	  arose	  from	  a	  corporate	  culture	  of	  tolerance	  
and	  deficient	  training,	  not	  wanton	  and	  reckless	  disregard	  for	  the	  lives	  and	  safety	  of	  
workers	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  accused.	  In	  principle,	  this	  finding	  could	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  
conviction	  of	  the	  corporation,	  but	  it	  had	  not	  been	  charged.73	  	  There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  case	  still	  
pending,	  against	  Mark	  Hritchuk,	  the	  service	  manager	  at	  a	  car	  dealership,	  where	  an	  
employee	  died	  after	  catching	  fire	  due	  to	  a	  broken	  fuel	  pump.74	  
	   Finally,	  in	  British	  Columbia,	  the	  United	  Steel	  Workers	  launched	  a	  private	  
prosecution	  in	  2010,	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  death	  of	  a	  Weyerhauser	  employee	  in	  British	  
Columbia	  in	  2004.	  	  The	  company	  was	  previously	  assessed	  a	  penalty	  of	  nearly	  $300,000	  by	  
the	  BC	  compensation	  board.	  	  A	  court	  has	  ruled	  that	  the	  union	  presented	  enough	  evidence	  
for	  the	  case	  to	  go	  forward,	  but	  the	  Crown	  subsequently	  intervened	  to	  terminate	  the	  
prosecution.75	  
	   The	  targeting	  of	  workers	  and	  low-­‐level	  supervisors	  in	  both	  OHS	  and	  Criminal	  Code	  
prosecutions	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  aggressively	  use	  the	  criminal	  law	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  
positive	  side	  of	  the	  enforcement	  data,	  which	  reflect	  an	  increase	  in	  inspectors	  generally,	  and	  
of	  proactive	  inspections	  in	  particular	  that	  target	  high-­‐risk	  firms	  and,	  through	  planned	  
                                                
73 2010 QCCQ 12364; Norman Keith and Anna Abbott, “Acquittal in Quebec Bill C-45 Charges” (Online 
http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/enewsletters/ohslaw/htmfiles/ohslaw20110427.en.html). 
74 Stefan Dubowski, “Complexity, Confusion Stymies C-45 Charges.” Canadian Occupational Health and Safety (1 
November 2010)   http://www.cos-mag.com/Legal/Legal-Stories/Complexity-confusion-stymies-C-45-charges.html 
(visited 8 August 2011). 
75 BC Court: Union’s Private Criminal Negligence Case Can Go Forward.” OHS Insider (8 March 
2011) online: http://ohsinsider.com/search-by-index/c45/bc-court-union%E2%80%99s-private-criminal-
negligence-prosecution-can-go-forward [accessed: 8 August 2011]; “Alert: Crown Dismisses Union 
Brought C-45 Case.” OHS Insider (25 August 2011).  Online http://ohsinsider.com/search-by-
index/c45/aug-25-crown-dismisses-union-brought-c-45-case [accessed 5 September 2011]. 
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safety	  blitzes,	  high-­‐risk	  hazards.76	  	  	  However,	  workers	  can	  never	  be	  complacent	  about	  the	  
gains	  they	  make	  in	  improved	  enforcement.	  	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  recession	  in	  2008,	  
which	  has	  hit	  Ontario	  particularly	  hard,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  dip	  in	  enforcement	  activity	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  as	  the	  government	  moves	  to	  trim	  its	  budget	  enforcement	  resources	  will	  
be	  lost.	  	  There	  has	  already	  been	  a	  shift	  in	  employment	  standards	  enforcement,	  toward	  a	  
self-­‐reliance	  model	  that	  places	  more	  responsibility	  of	  workers	  to	  pursue	  their	  claims	  with	  
their	  employers	  as	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  open	  for	  business	  agenda.77	  
	   The	  recent	  report	  of	  the	  Expert	  Advisory	  Panel	  on	  Occupational	  Health	  and	  Safety	  
(Dean	  Report)	  did	  not	  make	  strong	  recommendations	  on	  enforcement,	  seeking	  instead	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  concerns	  expressed	  to	  it	  by	  employer	  and	  labour	  stakeholders.	  	  Thus	  is	  
called	  for	  “a	  consistent	  approach	  of	  tough	  enforcement	  for	  serious	  and	  wilful	  
contraventions,	  as	  well	  as	  compliance	  assistance	  where	  guidance	  and	  support	  for	  
employers	  help	  achieve	  compliance”	  	  The	  report	  called	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  ticketing	  system,	  
with	  an	  eye	  toward	  increasing	  set	  fines,	  and	  for	  the	  addition	  of	  administrative	  monetary	  
                                                
76 For a description on Onatrio’s OHS enforcement strategy, see  
http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/sawo/index.php (visited 13 April 2011).  For a study that supports the 
efficacy of a blitz strategy in the context of workplace discrimination, see C. Elizabeth Hirsh, “The Strength of 
Weak Enforcement: The Impact of Discrimination Charges, Legal Environments, and Organizational Conditions on 
Workplace Segregation” (2009), 74 American Sociological Review 245. 
77 Open for Business Act, S.O. 2010, c. 16, Sch. 9, s. 1. For a critique, see Workers Action Centre 
and Parkdale Community Legal Services, Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic 
Affairs  regarding Schedule 9, Bill 68, An Act to promote Ontario as open for business by amending or repealing 
certain Acts (26 July 2010). Online http://www.workersactioncentre.org/!docs/sb_Bill68_eng.pdf (visited 14 Oct. 
2011). 
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penalties	  as	  an	  enforcement	  tool.78	  	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  the	  government	  will	  respond	  
to	  these	  recommendations.	  
	  	   Data	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  worker	  participation	  is	  harder	  to	  come	  by,	  but	  what	  little	  
there	  is	  suggests	  that	  it	  has	  weakened	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  or	  so.	  	  One	  study	  comparing	  IRS	  
systems	  in	  1990	  and	  2001	  found	  that	  worker	  influence	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  decline.	  	  Managers	  
viewed	  worker	  participation	  as	  less	  important	  and	  perceived	  that	  management	  bargaining	  
strength	  over	  OHS	  had	  increased.	  	  Worker	  representatives	  saw	  management	  as	  less	  
cooperative	  and	  perceived	  that	  workers	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  hassled	  by	  co-­‐workers	  for	  
raising	  health	  and	  safety	  issues	  or	  filing	  a	  workers’	  compensation	  claim.79	  	  Another	  possible	  
measure,	  albeit	  one	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  alternate	  interpretations,	  is	  the	  number	  of	  work	  
refusals	  reported	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour.80	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  tell	  us	  something	  
about	  worker	  OHS	  activism,	  the	  trend	  over	  most	  of	  this	  decade	  has	  been	  downwards	  (Chart	  
5).	  	  The	  recession	  of	  2008	  undoubtedly	  has	  exacerbated	  worker	  fear	  of	  job	  loss	  and	  
dampened	  their	  willingness	  to	  be	  militant	  around	  OHS	  issues.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
78 Ontario. Expert Advisory Panel on Occupational Health and Safety, Report and Recommendations to the Minister 
of Labour (December 2010) online at http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/pdf/eap_report.pdf, (Dean Report), 
42-44.  For a more detailed discussion of the Dean Report, see Lewchuk, this volume.  
79 Sybil Geldart, Harry S. Shannon, and Lynne Lohfeld, “Have Companies Improved Their Health and Safety 
Approaches Over the Last Decade? A Longitudinal Study” (2005) 47 American Journal of Industrial Medicine 227-
36). 
80 For an insightful analysis of work refusal behavior, see Garry C. Gray, “A Socio-Legal Ethnography of the Right 
to Refuse Dangerous Work” (2002), 24 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 133. 
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Chart	  5	  
(Source:	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Labour,	  Enforcement	  Statistics,	  various	  years)	  
	  
	   The	  decline	  in	  private	  sector	  union	  density	  in	  Canada	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  
from	  nearly	  30%	  in	  1981	  to	  just	  over	  16%	  in	  2009,	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  decreased	  
worker	  OHS	  activism	  of	  all	  kinds,	  given	  the	  significant	  link	  researchers	  have	  found	  between	  
union	  representation	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  worker	  participation.81	  	  The	  drop	  in	  union	  
density	  also	  translates	  into	  reduced	  bargaining	  power	  and	  militancy,	  as	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  
sharp	  drop	  in	  strike	  incidence	  since	  1976	  (Chart	  6).	  	  	  
	  
	  
                                                
81 For example, see Theo Nichols and David Walters, “Worker Representation on Health and Safety in the UK – 
Problems with the Preferred Model and Beyond” in Walters and Nichols, eds., Workplace Health and Safety 19; 
Wayne Lewchuk et al, “The Effectiveness of Bill 70 and Joint Health and Safety Committees in Reducing Injuries in 
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Chart	  6	  
(Source:	  HRSDC,	  http://www4.hrsdc.gc.ca/.3ndic.1t.4r@-­‐eng.jsp?iid=14)	  
	  
	  	   The	  Dean	  Report	  recognized	  that	  more	  needed	  to	  be	  done	  to	  support	  worker	  
participation	  in	  the	  IRS	  and	  made	  a	  number	  of	  recommendations,	  including:	  a	  measure	  to	  
permit	  worker	  chairs	  of	  JHSC	  to	  submit	  written	  recommendations	  to	  the	  employer	  when	  
the	  JHSC	  is	  deadlocked;	  mandatory	  training	  of	  health	  and	  safety	  representatives	  in	  small	  
(6-­‐19)	  workplaces;	  and	  improved	  protection	  from	  reprisals.82	  These	  recommendations	  
were	  acted	  upon	  by	  the	  government.83	  
	  	   Assessing	  the	  strength	  of	  employer	  OHS	  management	  is	  even	  more	  difficult.	  	  One	  
study	  found	  that	  on	  several	  measures	  OHS	  management	  improved	  between	  1990	  and	  
                                                
82 Dean Report, 28-31, 49-51. 
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2001.	  Senior	  managers	  were	  more	  directly	  involved	  in	  safety,	  safety	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
included	  in	  managerial	  job	  descriptions,	  and	  more	  safety	  training	  was	  provided	  to	  
workers.84	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  increased	  experience	  rating	  has	  created	  an	  economic	  
incentive	  to	  better	  manage	  safety,	  although	  the	  evidence	  is	  decidedly	  mixed	  with	  studies	  
showing	  that	  the	  most	  frequent	  response	  of	  employers	  is	  to	  control	  claims	  cost,	  often	  
through	  aggressive	  claims	  management.85	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  growth	  of	  small	  business	  
and	  de-­‐centralized	  production	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  
capacity	  of	  employers	  to	  manage	  OHS.86	  	  
	  	   The	  Dean	  Report	  also	  made	  some	  recommendations	  to	  enhance	  employer	  capacity,	  
competence	  and	  commitment	  to	  manage	  OHS	  risks.	  	  These	  include	  mandatory	  OHS	  training	  
for	  supervisors	  responsible	  for	  frontline	  workers,	  an	  accreditation	  system	  for	  employers	  
that	  successfully	  implement	  OHS	  management	  systems,	  appropriate	  financial	  incentives	  for	  
firms	  that	  qualify	  suppliers	  based	  on	  their	  OHS	  performance,	  and	  more	  compliance	  
assistance	  from	  inspectors.	  	  It	  also	  made	  recommendations	  aimed	  at	  improving	  compliance	  
in	  the	  small	  business	  sector.	  Importantly,	  none	  of	  the	  proposals	  are	  offered	  as	  alternatives	  
to	  strong	  enforcement	  and	  worker	  participation.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  suggestion	  that	  
accredited	  employers	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  routine	  inspections	  and	  the	  report	  is	  clear	  
                                                
84 Geldart et al.;  A related study found that firms with better OHS management had lower lost-time injury rates.  
See Sybil Geldart et al., “Organizational Practices and Workplace Health and Safety: A Cross-Sectional Study in 
Manufacturing Companies” (2010) 48 Safety Science 562.  
85 Emile Tompa, Scott Trevithick and Chris McLeod, “Systematic Review of the Prevention Incentives of Insurance 
and Regulatory Mechanisms for Occupational Health and Safety” (2007) 33 Scandinavian Journal of Work, 
Environment & Health  85; Michele Campolieti, Douglas Hyatt and Terry Thomason, “Experience Rating, Work 
Injuries and Benefit Costs: Some New Evidence” (2006) 61 Relations Industrielles 118. 
86 Michael Quinlan, “The Implications of Labour Market Restructuring in Industrialized Societies for Occupational 
Health and Safety” (1999), 20Economic and Industrial Democracy 427; Joan Eakin, “’Leaving it Up to the 
Workers’: Sociological Perspective on the Management of Health and Safety in Small Workplaces” (1992), 22 
International Journal of Health Services 689. 
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that	  more	  compliance	  assistance	  “should	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  inspector’s	  duty	  to	  enforce	  
the	  law.”	  	  Moreover,	  the	  report	  also	  recognizes	  that	  financial	  incentives	  should	  not	  be	  based	  
primarily	  on	  claims	  cost	  and	  frequency.87	  
	  	   The	  relevance	  of	  Ontario’s	  recent	  OHS	  regime	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  provides	  
evidence	  that	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  regulation/paternalism	  is	  not	  the	  inevitable	  destination	  of	  
Robens	  style	  regimes.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  indicates	  that	  after	  a	  regime	  starts	  down	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  
path,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Ontario	  (ironically	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  a	  labour	  friendly	  
government),	  its	  direction	  can	  be	  changed,	  even	  with	  a	  conservative	  government	  in	  power.	  	  
It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  intervention	  to	  endeavour	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  this	  
development,88	  other	  than	  to	  suggest	  that	  perhaps	  in	  some	  way	  the	  assignment	  of	  
prevention	  activities	  to	  the	  Workplace	  Safety	  and	  Insurance	  Board,	  where	  a	  discourse	  of	  
partnership	  and	  ‘safety	  pays’	  predominates,	  created	  more	  space	  for	  the	  MOL	  to	  define	  its	  
mandate	  as	  that	  of	  setting	  and	  enforcing	  standards.	  	  If	  that	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  principal	  
recommendation	  of	  the	  Dean	  Report	  to	  move	  prevention	  activities	  back	  into	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Labour,	  a	  recommendation	  that	  the	  government	  has	  already	  implemented,	  may	  pose	  the	  
risk	  of	  a	  re-­‐orientation	  away	  from	  enforcement.89	  	  Moreover,	  the	  recent	  dip	  in	  enforcement	  
activity	  is	  a	  timely	  reminder	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  a	  strong	  programme	  of	  
proactive	  enforcement	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  recession	  which	  has	  resulted	  in	  significant	  job	  loss,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector.90	  
                                                
87 Dean Report, 53.  Also see, 34 (supervisor training), and 37-42 (incentives).  On March 3, 2011, the government 
introduced Bill 160 to implement some of the Dean Report’s recommendations. 
88 Elsewhere I tried to explain diverges between selected Canadian jurisdictions based on trade union density, 
employer size, etc.  Tucker, “Diverging Trends.” 
89 S.O. 2011, c. 11. 
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   This	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  final	  question	  I	  want	  to	  address,	  which	  is	  whether	  a	  
progressive	  new	  governance	  theory	  has	  anything	  to	  offer.	  	  Here	  I	  turn	  briefly	  to	  recent	  
work	  by	  Gordon	  and	  Fine	  who	  start	  from	  the	  same	  premise	  of	  folks	  like	  Lobel	  and	  Estlund	  -­‐	  
that	  existing	  forms	  of	  command	  and	  control	  regulation	  are	  deficient	  and	  that	  moving	  
forward	  will	  require	  the	  mobilization	  of	  civil	  society	  forces.	  	  However,	  unlike	  Lobel	  and	  
Estlund,	  they	  reject	  the	  turn	  toward	  self-­‐regulation	  as	  inevitable	  or	  desirable.	  	  Rather,	  their	  
project	  aims	  to	  engage	  workers	  as	  monitors	  in	  public	  enforcement.91	  	  Their	  particular	  
concern	  is	  the	  enforcement	  of	  labour	  standards,	  particularly	  hours	  of	  work	  and	  minimum	  
wages,	  and	  this	  dictates	  a	  focus	  on	  vulnerable	  workers	  in	  the	  non-­‐union	  sector	  –	  the	  
paradigm	  case	  of	  the	  new	  world	  of	  work.	  	  Given	  a	  world	  in	  which	  state	  enforcement	  is	  
chronically	  under-­‐resourced,	  unions	  have	  limited	  reach	  and	  the	  incidence	  and	  distribution	  
of	  complaints	  is	  unlikely	  to	  reflect	  the	  pattern	  of	  actual	  violations,92	  their	  recommendations	  
aim	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  of	  third-­‐party	  worker	  representatives	  who	  can	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  
public	  enforcement	  into	  sectors	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  where	  workers	  are	  at	  high	  risk	  of	  
violations	  but	  also	  less	  well	  protected.	  	  These	  third-­‐parties	  could	  be	  unions	  with	  roots	  in	  a	  
particular	  industry,	  but	  could	  also	  include	  workers’	  centres	  or	  other	  workers’	  
organizations.	  	  For	  worker	  organizations	  to	  have	  a	  meaningful	  impact	  on	  enforcement,	  Fine	  
and	  Gordon	  stipulate	  that	  collaborations	  with	  government	  must	  be	  formalized,	  sustained	  
and	  vigorous,	  and	  adequately	  resourced.	  	  They	  suggest	  a	  number	  of	  models,	  ranging	  from	  
                                                
91 Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon, “Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partnership with Workers 
Organizations (2010) 38 Politics & Society 552; and “Beyond the New Regulatory Scholarship: Strengthening the 
Role of State and Civil Society in Labor Standards Enforcement” (unpublished). 
92 David Weil and Amanda Pyles, “Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and  the Problem of Enforcement in 
the U.S. Workplace” (2005) 27  Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 59. 
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deputizing	  persons	  associated	  with	  workers’	  organizations	  to	  designating	  workers’	  
organizations	  as	  sites	  where	  workers	  can	  anonymously	  register	  complaints	  to	  having	  
workers’	  organizations	  provide	  enforcers	  with	  intelligence	  that	  would	  assist	  them	  in	  
identifying	  high	  risk	  employers	  or	  industries.	  	  	  
	  	   In	  some	  ways,	  their	  proposal	  resembles	  the	  Swedish	  regional	  safety	  representative	  
system,	  except	  that	  the	  focus	  here	  is	  much	  less	  on	  providing	  assistance	  to	  the	  IRS	  than	  on	  
strengthening	  the	  ERS.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  model	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  unionized	  workers	  in	  their	  
own	  workplaces.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Canadian	  Auto	  Workers	  recently	  reported	  on	  the	  efforts	  
of	  a	  local	  that	  represents	  federally	  regulated	  workers	  in	  the	  airline	  industry	  to	  build	  
relationships	  with	  federal	  OHS	  inspectors	  so	  that	  they	  can	  more	  easily	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  
intervene	  when	  the	  union	  is	  unable	  to	  secure	  satisfactory	  responses	  from	  their	  
employers.93	  	  	  
	  	   The	  approach	  advocated	  by	  Fine	  and	  Gordon	  faces	  many	  obstacles	  and	  may	  not	  be	  
realized	  except	  on	  an	  exceptional	  basis.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  priority	  given	  to	  building	  pubic	  
enforcement	  and	  enhancing	  worker	  participation	  -­‐	  that	  is	  toward	  building	  a	  worker	  
democratic	  regime	  -­‐	  arguably	  has	  more	  potential	  in	  the	  long	  run	  than	  a	  ‘new’	  new	  
governance	  alternative	  that	  relegates	  these	  elements	  to	  a	  secondary	  and	  supporting	  role	  in	  
a	  regime	  that	  gives	  primacy	  to	  employer	  self-­‐regulation.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Conclusion	  
	  	   For	  the	  most	  part,	  ‘new’	  new	  governance	  theories	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  same	  consensus	  
theory	  that	  informed	  ‘old’	  new	  governance	  theory	  as	  articulated	  by	  the	  Robens	  Report	  and	  
                                                
93 Ian Bennie, Ben Bachl and Rossanna Dewey, “Success, One Small Step at a Time”  CAW Health, Safety  
Environment Newsletter (Sept.-Dec. 2010), 3. 
	  
 
44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OSGOODE	  CLPE	  RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [VOL.	  08	  NO.08]	  
that	  was	  so	  effectively	  criticized	  by	  Nichols	  and	  Armstrong	  nearly	  40	  years	  ago.	  	  Lobel	  and	  
Estlund	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  salience	  of	  power	  imbalances	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  and,	  
therefore,	  call	  for	  robust	  worker	  participation	  and	  public	  enforcement	  as	  adjuncts	  to	  a	  
regime	  of	  regulated	  self-­‐regulation.	  	  However,	  for	  both,	  worker	  participation	  and	  public	  
enforcement	  are	  truly	  secondary.	  	  Lobel	  justifies	  a	  focus	  on	  self-­‐regulation	  by	  minimizing	  
the	  extent	  of	  conflict	  over	  OHS,	  while	  Estlund	  sees	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  and	  therefore	  
efforts	  must	  focus	  on	  steering	  self-­‐regulation	  toward	  more	  effective	  worker	  protection.	  	  I	  
argue	  their	  policy	  prescriptions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  toward	  neo-­‐liberal	  self	  
regulation/paternalism	  than	  toward	  worker	  or	  social	  democracy.	  	  The	  example	  of	  
enforcement	  in	  Ontario	  suggests	  that	  the	  trend	  toward	  more	  self-­‐regulation	  is	  not	  
inevitable	  and	  that	  Gordon	  and	  Fine’s	  strategy	  of	  enhancing	  public	  regulation	  and	  
enforcement	  through	  partnerships	  with	  worker	  organizations	  is	  feasible	  and	  promising.	  	  Of	  
course	  there	  are	  significant	  limits	  to	  what	  can	  be	  accomplished	  in	  an	  increasingly	  neo-­‐
liberal	  capitalist	  social	  formation,	  which	  exacerbates	  the	  structural	  pressure	  to	  put	  profit	  
over	  safety,	  but	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  that	  employers	  who	  are	  inspected	  and	  sanctioned	  
for	  OHS	  violations	  become	  more	  actively	  engaged	  in	  workplace	  prevention.94	  	  Indeed,	  the	  
authors	  of	  one	  recent	  study	  conclude	  that	  “to	  confine	  the	  role	  of	  prosecution	  to	  a	  measure	  
of	  last	  resort,	  then,	  is	  not	  only	  without	  empirical	  foundation,	  but	  also	  likely	  to	  send	  the	  
‘wrong	  message’	  to	  employers	  about	  how	  the	  problem	  of	  serious	  OHS	  offences	  is	  
                                                
94 For a recent literature review, see Kevin Purse and Jillian Dorrian, “Deterrence and Enforcement of Occupational 
Health and Safety Law” (2011), 27 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 23. 
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understood	  by	  regulatory	  authorities	  and	  in	  civil	  society	  more	  broadly.”95	  	  In	  short,	  instead	  
of	  new	  governance	  approaches	  that	  depend	  on	  common	  interest	  or	  the	  mobilization	  of	  
market	  forces	  by	  civil	  society	  groups,	  we	  are	  better	  off	  developing	  strategies	  that	  
concentrate	  on	  strengthening	  worker	  voice	  and	  public	  regulation.	  96	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  such	  
an	  approach	  avoids	  valorizing	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  and	  practices	  that,	  as	  Nichols	  and	  




                                                
95 Toni Schofield, Belinda Reeve and Ron McCallum, “Deterrence and OHS Prosecutions: Prosecuted Employers’ 
Responses” (2009), 25 Journal of Occupational Health and Safety – Australia and New Zealand 263 at 275. 
96 David Weil’s work on enforcement is particularly helpful.  For example, see David Weil, Improving Workplace 
Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement (Report to the Wage and Hour Division, May 2010) online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623390. 
